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Abstract 
This paper uses a nationally representative sample of agricultural businesses in Tanzania to 
empirically investigate the determinants of credit constraint status and its impact on 
agricultural productivity. In particular, we directly elicit the nature of the credit constraints 
experienced by crop producers. Subsequently, we evaluate the effect on crop output value per 
hectare using an endogenous switching regression model, which simultaneously estimates the 
likelihood of being credit constrained and its impact on productivity. The results provide 
evidence that the relaxation of all credit constraints would significantly enhance agricultural 
productivity; hence, contributing favourably to rural development, poverty alleviation, and 
the improvement of living standards in Tanzania. Moreover, consideration of only quantity 
constraints was shown to underestimate the full impact of credit constraint status in the 
presence of transaction costs and risk constraints. We advocate for the Tanzanian agricultural 
policy framework to adopt a broader definition of credit constraint status in pursuit of 
agricultural and economic development. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In Tanzania, living standards are inextricably linked to agricultural development, however the 
performance of the agricultural sector has been steadily deteriorating over time. Around three 
quarters of the labour force are involved in the sector, typically on a semi-subsistence basis; 
and a substantial portion of aggregate economic output and export activity is attributable to 
agricultural activity. The importance of the sector is indisputable, however its development 
has been persistently constrained by underinvestment; sustained by uncertainty and instability 
in the broader economy, in addition to concerns about the real and perceived risks of rural 
sector activity. 
The allocation of commercial credit to agricultural activity has been relatively low as 
compared to other sectors of the economy. Credit rationing and the proliferation of short-term 
loan facilities, with limited offerings for medium to long-term capital, characterize the 
Tanzanian agricultural financing landscape. Commercial banks account for the largest share 
of disbursements to the sector; and informal and semiformal financial institutions such as 
family and friends, savings and credit groups, and microfinance institutions play a significant 
role in the provision of credit. The livelihoods of agricultural households are directly related 
to their farm activity, which may be influenced by their access to credit. Hence, the 
consideration of credit constraint status and its effects on the productivity of agricultural 
producers presents an opportunity to clearly define and address the economic development 
challenges of Tanzania. 
The agricultural policy framework aims to guide the efforts and resources of Tanzania 
towards the sustainable eradication of poverty and the improvement of living standards over 
the long term, by creating an enabling and conducive policy environment for enhanced 
activity in the sector. The government’s role will be critical to improve the capacity and 
coordination efforts of financial institutions and intermediaries in order to enhance 
awareness, access, and accessibility of finance to farmers. The collaborative efforts of private 
and public stakeholders will be required in order to advance the agricultural sector towards 
being a modern, commercial driver of the economy, which is efficient, productive, and 
competitive. 
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1.2 Problem statement 
The implications of credit rationing in developing markets with imperfect information have 
been investigated in theoretical credit market literature; which postulates that imperfect and 
costly information and enforcement induces the suppliers of loanable funds to ration credit 
despite the presence of excess demand (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Jaffee and Stiglitz 1990). 
Consequently, the inefficient allocation of capital resources and the resultant underinvestment 
in the economy are expected to ensue and persist. Hence, credit rationing as an equilibrium 
phenomenon presents a departure from the classical economics argument that an equilibrium 
price is expected to clear the market and ensure an efficient allocation of resources when 
supply equates to demand. 
The agricultural household model provides theoretical insights into the simultaneous 
consumption and production decisions made by semi-commercial agricultural households 
(Singh et al 1986; Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995). In particular, the implications of an 
agricultural household’s credit constraint status may be coherently modeled to account for 
decisions at the farm and household levels, respectively. The literature posits that 
unconstrained households are able to separate these decisions, while constrained households 
tend to exhibit non-separability in their decision-making. Non-separability may result in the 
consumption and production needs of a household competing for liquid capital resources, 
while separability enables decisions to be made independently and optimally (Foltz 2004). 
In their seminal paper, Feder et al (1990) postulate that rationing in credit markets may result 
in liquidity being a binding constraint on agricultural productivity. As a result of the 
biological lag arising from the transformation of inputs obtained at the start of the production 
period into agricultural outputs yielded at the end of the production cycle, there is a timing 
mismatch between when capital is required and when the returns on agricultural activity are 
realized. The quality and volume of agricultural inputs available to a producer may be 
constrained by the extent of access to credit. Hence, it is expected that improvements in 
agricultural productivity and farm incomes will be limited by inadequate finance towards 
productive inputs, land, and physical capital. Further, financing constraints hamper the 
adoption of modern technologies, which may enhance agricultural activity. Access to credit, 
in addition to the initial endowment available to an agricultural household, would address the 
funding gap experienced by agricultural businesses and enable essential investments in 
working capital and critical factors of production. 
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The productivity and welfare of Chinese agricultural households was found to be enhanced 
by increased access to credit, albeit the findings suggested that farm credit was 
disproportionately allocated toward consumption and investment activities (Feder et al 1990). 
Petrick (2002; 2004) found that the provision of interest rate subsidies by the government 
significantly and positively enhanced agricultural production of Polish farms. In Tanzania, 
Winter-Nelson and Temu (2005) found that enhanced access to credit had a significant 
impact on agricultural production volumes for coffee farmers that self-identified as liquidity 
constrained; further, contributing to the alleviation of poverty. Moreover, Foltz (2004) found 
that credit rationing in Tunisia negatively impacted farm profitably. However, Diagne and 
Zeller (2004) found that access to microcredit did not improve the welfare of agricultural 
households in Malawi. Guirkinger and Boucher (2008) found that the elimination of credit 
constraints, using a broader definition that acknowledges transaction and risk constraints, in 
addition to quantity constraints, would significantly enhance the productivity of agricultural 
households in Peru. In Rwanda, Ali et al (2014) made use of a broader definition of credit 
constraint status and found that the relaxation of credit constraints would significantly 
enhance agricultural productivity. 
Evidence on the agricultural productivity impacts of credit constraint status has been 
extensively documented, however the empirical approaches adopted by the respective studies 
are largely inconsistent in their methodological approach and operationalization of credit 
constraints. Additionally, while empirical studies have focused adequately on credit rationing 
in developing markets, there has been limited research undertaken on credit rationing in the 
context of Tanzania. 
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1.3 Research questions and scope 
In view of the aforementioned background and research problem, this study raises the 
primary research question: 
What is the impact of credit constraints on agricultural productivity in Tanzania? 
 
In addressing the research question, this paper raises relevant policy recommendations that 
may improve farmers’ access to credit as a means to enhance agricultural productivity and 
address the development goals of Tanzania. Hence, this paper poses the ancillary question: 
What are the relevant policy recommendations that can enhance smallholder farmers’ access 
to credit financial services? 
 
This paper will undertake a comprehensive and robust study by investigating various 
specifications in the econometric estimation of the impact of credit constraint status on 
agricultural productivity and further, by adopting various definitions of the credit constraint 
status prevalent in the empirical credit rationing literature. We are particularly interested in 
agricultural activity within the current production period; as such, the implications of our 
findings are interpretable within the context of a 12-month period. Hence, the medium to 
long-term implications of intertemporal choices are not evaluated in the context of the current 
research. Further, an evaluation of the policy implications proposed by this study is beyond 
the scope. 
1.4 Research hypothesis 
The null hypothesis for the study is: 
: There is no relationship between the credit constraint status and productivity of 
agricultural businesses in Tanzania. 
Which will be tested against the alternative hypothesis: 
: Constrained agricultural businesses in Tanzania have a lower productivity than 
unconstrained agricultural businesses. 
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1.5 Purpose and significance of the study 
In this paper we investigate the determinants of credit constraint status and its impact on 
agricultural productivity, with a particular focus on Tanzanian crop producers. We contribute 
to the empirical credit rationing literature by using a nationally representative sample of 
Tanzanian agricultural businesses to evaluate whether credit constraints adversely impact 
farm productivity. The investigation is based on a cross-sectional dataset of 3,374 agricultural 
businesses surveyed in 2011.   
This paper has implications for agricultural policy makers with interests in advancing 
agricultural development, financial institutions and private stakeholders with interests in 
undertaking agricultural investments, and farmers with interests in enhancing agricultural 
productivity inter alia. 
The direct elicitation method is used to delineate the credit constraint status of agricultural 
businesses (Boucher et al 2009; Guirkinger and Boucher 2008). Thereafter, an investigation 
into its impact on productivity is undertaken using an endogenous switching regression 
model (Feder et al 1990, Lokshin and Sajaia 2004). We evaluate the treatment effects of the 
output equation in order to analyze the extent and significance of the relationship between 
credit constraint status and agricultural productivity (Di Falco et al 2011; Asfaw et al 2012). 
In summary, the results show that credit constraint status has a significant impact on 
agricultural productivity that appears robust across different definitions of credit constraints 
and specifications. In particular, it is found that unconstrained agricultural businesses earn 
more than constrained businesses, while borrowers earn more than non-borrowers. The 
findings suggest that the relaxation of credit constraints may result in constrained agricultural 
businesses improving their productivity by approximately TZS 793,367 per hectare or 192%. 
An examination of the likelihood of being credit constrained reveals that businesses that were 
located in urban areas, held a title deed, or received a government input subsidy were less 
likely to be constrained. Further, agricultural business owners that completed higher levels of 
education and had more dependents are less likely to be constrained. On the contrary, the 
likelihood of experiencing credit constraints is increased for older agricultural business 
owners that hold savings, own storage or warehouse facilities, or obtained advice from the 
government or farming associations. 
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The estimated treatment effects show that, on average, credit constraint relaxation has a 
larger impact on those businesses that are actually credit constrained, whereas agricultural 
businesses observed as unconstrained would not benefit commensurately. Further, we find 
insufficient evidence to suggest that unconstrained businesses are better producers than their 
constrained counterparts. 
Finally, a comparison of treatment effects across constraint definitions suggests that the 
impact of credit constraints may be underestimated by an examination of quantity constraints 
only, i.e. when transactions costs and risk constraints are not taken into account. 
1.6 Organisation of the study 
This paper is organized in seven main chapters, including this introduction. In what follows, 
Chapter 2 contains a comprehensive review of the credit market literature and establishes the 
conceptual framework underlying our investigation. Chapter 3 presents stylized facts about 
the Tanzanian farm sector and rural credit market. Chapter 4 contains a thorough overview of 
the research approach and strategy that is used to analyze the determinants of credit constraint 
status and its impacts on agricultural productivity. Chapter 5 and 6 present the results and 
discussion, respectively, culminating in a summary of the findings and their policy 
implications; and Chapter 7 concludes the study. 
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Chapter 2. Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide a review of the literature on credit rationing, with a particular 
emphasis on developing markets. A thorough exposition of relevant key terms and definitions 
is undertaken in section two, in order to provide clarity and consistency on the concepts used 
in this study. In section three the causes, countermeasures, and consequences of credit 
rationing are explored within the framework of imperfect information; it is demonstrated that 
credit rationing is typically an equilibrium phenomenon. The theoretical framework 
underpinning the investigation into the behavior of and impacts on credit constrained 
agricultural households is outlined in the fourth section, where we provide motivations for 
the use of the production side of an agricultural household model to investigate the impact of 
credit constraints. In section five, relevant empirical literature is canvassed; the key 
objectives and significant findings are discussed. Various experiences of credit rationing and 
its effects on productivity are documented; and a brief summary of the salient points 
concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Definitions and key concepts 
Credit involves an exchange of value or resources now for the promise of compensation later; 
this exchange may occur in the goods, services, or financial markets. The fundamental basis 
of credit is trust. Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990, p.838) remark on the heterogeneous nature of 
promises, making a comparison to the homogeneous nature of commodities in standard 
markets. In the latter, the exchange of value is typically simultaneous, whereas in credit 
markets the time lag between delivery of value and compensation presents opportunities for 
promises to be broken. 
The sustainability of credit market activity depends on the credibility of the commitments 
undertaken and the fulfillment of the agreements set forth (Rao 2003, p.15). The 
determination of the likelihood that a promise will be kept is both an art and a science; the art 
of establishing the credibility of a potential borrower and the science of evaluating the degree 
of uncertainty associated with their activities. Thus, lenders oftentimes take mitigating 
actions to enhance the likelihood of fulfillment (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990).
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Diagne and Zeller (2001, p.64) draw a distinction between access to credit and participation 
in credit. The former is concerned with the ability of a loan applicant to borrow from a 
particular source and the extent to which they can borrow, while the latter denotes the actual 
borrowing event. A borrower’s access to credit is typically represented by a credit limit, 
while participation is implied by the loans outstanding. Non-borrowers are characterized by a 
lack of participation in credit, however we may not strictly infer a lack of access. 
Access to credit is a necessary condition for participation in credit, however it is not 
sufficient. Conversely, participation in credit is not necessary to infer access to credit. The 
extent of participation is bounded by the extent of access, however the borrowing capacity of 
a loan applicant need not match the desired loan amount. A borrower may elect to borrow 
less than they are able to or they may desire to borrow more. 
The term credit rationing is broadly characterized by an excess private demand for loanable 
funds (Petrick 2005, p.192). The definition of credit rationing may take on different forms 
based on the degree of persistence of excess demand and the factors inhibiting loan supply. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, p.365) and Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990, pp.848-849) provide 
structured expositions of two forms of credit rationing: pure credit rationing and redlining. 
Pure credit rationing describes circumstances wherein seemingly indistinguishable loan 
applicants, subject to the same terms of agreement, exhibit varying obtainability of loans. 
Redlining pertains to distinguishable groups of loan applicants. As the number of group 
classifications increases, with corresponding decreases in the number of borrowers in each 
group, the characteristics of redlining bear a resemblance to pure credit rationing. 
Across groups of risk-classified loan applicants, variability in expected returns relative to the 
required return may influence the viability of loans. The required return of a lender is a 
function of the cost of loanable funds, which may serve as an implied hurdle rate for the 
extension of credit. 
Both forms of credit rationing preclude the extension of loans to rejected applicants or an 
increase in the loan size to particular participants that desire more credit, even if a higher 
interest rate would be paid. Thus, the interest rate does not necessarily serve as a mechanism 
to clear the market.
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Hence, credit rationing results in circumstances wherein potential borrowers lack access to 
credit or the extent of borrowers participation is limited; these circumstances are denoted by 
credit constraints (Feder et al 1990, p.1153). That is, the extent of participation may be 
constrained by the extent of access, for both non-borrowers and borrowers. While credit 
rationing describes a market-level phenomenon, credit constraints characterize the outcome 
of this phenomenon as experienced by economic agents. 
2.3 Causes, countermeasures, and consequences of credit rationing 
Causes of credit rationing 
Classical economic analysis argues that the price of a good is determined through the 
interaction of supply and demand; and the equilibrium price is established where supply and 
demand equates. It is expected that an excess demand for a good would result in a greater 
willingness to pay, particularly at higher prices. Consequently, these higher prices are 
expected to entice suppliers to provide more goods and would iteratively be bid up to the 
point where supply equals demand at a new, higher equilibrium point. 
Within the classical context, an excess demand for credit is expected to result in an increase 
in the price of credit (i.e. interest rate) up to the point where demand for credit and the supply 
of funds equate. In the absence of externalities, an efficient credit market is characterized by 
a lack of incentives to reallocate loans when an individual may be made better off while 
making another participant in the loan market worse off (Besley 1994, pp.29-30). A 
reallocation of credit would only occur if there were mutual gains to be achieved. 
According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, pp.393-394) the price mechanism of interest rates has 
a direct impact on the demand for credit, while the supply of funds is indirectly impacted 
through the expected return to lenders. The expected return to a lender is a function of both 
the interest rate and the riskiness inherent in a loan. 
Credit markets are subject to asymmetric information between lenders and loan applicants. 
Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990, p.850) posit that a lender’s access to information, relating to the 
expected return and riskiness of a borrower’s activity, may be constrained to an average 
account of the activities in the economy. The differential access to information, concerning 
the characteristics of borrowers’ activities, is therefore expected to result in divergent 
appraisals of risk. 
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The relationship between the interest rate and the expected return is not necessarily 
monotonic; it can be observed that an increase in the former need not be matched by a 
commensurate increase in the latter (see Figure 1).  A borrower’s return on investment may 
be enhanced by increasing the riskiness of their activities, while the return that a lender 
expects to receive from a loan portfolio may be undermined by increases in the riskiness of 
individual loans. From the lenders perspective, the increased riskiness may result in an 
increase in a borrower’s probability of default, which would counteract any gains from the 
higher interest rate.  
 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between interest rates an lender expected returns 
The optimal interest rate (r*) is the rate at which lenders maximize their expected returns; and 
beyond r*, lenders would expect to receive a lower return. The optimal rate is not necessarily 
the price of credit where supply equals demand (i.e. the market clearing price), however it 
reflects the equilibrium rate. 
Lenders perceive loan applicants that are willing to pay interest rates above r* to represent 
more risk than the average loan at the optimal rate (Jaffee and Stiglitz 1990, pp.853-854). 
Hence, loans would not be extended over and above r*. Lenders would find it in their interest 
to lower their interest rate from the market-clearing price to r*, despite the optimal rate 
representing an excess demand for credit. Consequently, credit rationing characterizes 
markets where the market-clearing price and optimal interest rate are not equivalent; in 
particular, where the former exceeds the latter. 
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A lender’s imprecision in understanding the particular characteristics of individual borrowers 
may result in the adverse selection of loan applicants (Besley 1994, p.35). Thus, lenders are 
faced with a screening problem whereby limited information presents challenges in 
identifying those potential borrowers who are more likely to repay. 
The constrained information set available to a lender limits their understanding of the 
inherent risks of particular loans; and the interest charged to a pool of loan applicants is based 
on the average risk of the portfolio (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990, p.239). Individual borrowers, at a 
given interest rate, may conduct activities across different risk categories. Differential risk 
characteristics reflect differences in the likelihood that individual borrowers will settle their 
outstanding obligations, however it may be costly to obtain the relevant information to 
precisely furcate loan applicants. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, p.393) postulate that the interest rate may serve as a screening 
device, in addition to its role as the price of credit. Loan applicants that are engaged in high-
risk activities may be willing to commit to pay higher interest rates, as they perceive their 
likelihood of repayment to be low. As the interest rate charged to a pool of loan applicants 
increases, those who perceive themselves to have lower risk relative to the average portfolio 
may voluntarily remove themselves from the credit market. As such, the composition of loan 
applicants may change adversely and the nature of activities undertaken may become riskier, 
potentially compromising a lender’s expected return (Jaffee and Stiglitz 1990, p.858). 
A lender is not able to directly monitor and control all the actions of a borrower due to the 
imperfect and costly nature of information. Consequently, a moral hazard or incentives 
problem arises as the ex post behavior of a borrower is likely to change following the 
extension of credit. 
An increase in the interest rate may induce a borrower to pursue activities that would yield 
relatively higher returns, if successful (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, pp.401-402). However, the 
probability of success of such activities is expected to typically be lower than similar 
activities with lower returns.  While a lender’s expected return is determined by considering 
the actions of a borrower in both a state of default and a state of success, a borrower is 
typically only concerned with the returns in the latter; as default may absolve the borrower of 
any obligations. 
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Therefore, an increase in the interest rate, to accommodate an excess demand for credit, may 
result in a misalignment of lenders’ incentives and borrowers’ interests. Hence, credit 
rationing is further reinforced by lenders’ aversion to the inducement of adverse behaviour. 
The enforcement problem arises in credit markets as a result of difficulties in compelling 
repayment. Hence, a legal framework that provides comprehensive guidance on legal 
enforcement is pivotal (Besley 1994, p.29). The costs and complexity of enforcement may 
deter lenders from supplying credit, further contributing to the persistence of credit rationing. 
Enforcement may further be undermined in contexts where legal recourse is limited or 
ineffective (Jaffee and Stiglitz 1990, pp.863-864). 
Countermeasures 
Hoff and Stiglitz (1990, pp.237-241) identify various direct and indirect mechanisms to 
mitigate the risks associated with asymmetric information. Direct mechanisms place the 
burden on the lender for mitigating risks associated with the extension of credit. Indirect 
mechanisms place the responsibility and accountability for maintaining the terms of a loan 
contract with the borrower, while providing the lender with avenues for recourse in the event 
of default. 
The cost implications of direct screening, monitoring and enforcement vary across different 
lenders, which could result in segmentation in credit markets. Informal lenders may face a 
low cost burden as a result of their close proximity to sources of information relating to 
borrowers’ activities. On the contrary, formal lenders may find it difficult and costly to gain 
privy to such information. 
The terms explicitly and implicitly specified by loan contracts may be designed as indirect 
mechanisms to attract applicants with low risks. Further, the stipulated terms are crafted to 
induce borrowers to align their interests with those of lenders; and settle their obligations as 
they fall due. Borrowers may be incentivized to avoid the reputational effects of default in 
order to ensure access to credit in the future. 
The moderation of loan size has been suggested as an indirect mechanism to mitigate risky 
borrower behavior in markets with credit rationing. Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990, p.868) argue 
that in a context where a borrower’s activities are indivisible, a smaller loan size may require 
that the borrower incur greater liability, however the larger risk exposure may induce adverse 
borrower behavior. 
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Increasing collateral requirements may have a positive incentive effect resulting from 
increased borrower liability; however this could be undermined by a negative selection effect 
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, pp.402-403). It is shown that the sorting effect of an increase in 
collateral may result in a sub-optimal expected return, under conditions where all individuals 
have the same utility. It is reasonable to assume that wealthier individuals are more capable 
of putting up higher collateral requirements; however, these individuals are expected to be 
less risk averse. Hence, an increase in collateral requirements may have the adverse effect of 
increasing the riskiness of a lender’s loan portfolio. 
Consequences 
A lender’s response to imperfect and costly information and enforcement will be to 
persistently ration credit when demand exceeds supply, either by reducing the size of the 
loans that are extended or by rejecting loan applications outright. Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990, 
p.839) posit that the inefficient allocation of resources would thus result in less investment 
being made in an economy. 
Underinvestment occurs when borrowers’ private levels of investment are persistently lower 
than socially desirable levels (Petrick, 2005, p.192); while in the absence of market failures, 
private investment is consistent with the socially desirable investment required to realize the 
welfare goals of society. Access to quality information may enhance lenders’ willingness to 
extend credit, which would have a favourable impact on lenders, borrowers, and the economy 
as a whole. 
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2.4 Conceptual Framework 
The agricultural household represents a framework that effectively captures the coinciding 
consumption and production behavior of semi-commercial farm households. Singh et al 
(1986) and Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) present comprehensive theoretical expositions of 
agricultural household models, which combine the microeconomic behavior of the household 
and the firm (or farm in this instance). 
An agricultural household that has unconstrained access to credit, or a non-binding credit 
constraint, is able to separate consumption and production decisions. Foltz (2004, p.230) 
argues that separability presents an opportunity for the household to optimize production by 
choosing inputs optimally and independent of consumption choices. However, when credit is 
a binding constraint the separability and independence of these decisions breaks down and 
the consumption and production sides of the household tend to compete for liquid resources. 
Following Petrick (2002), the theoretical treatment of agricultural households adopted in this 
study will focus on the production side of agricultural household decision-making. Further, 
this study shall restrict itself to the presentation of a heuristic1 conceptual framework of the 
agricultural household. The model in this chapter is developed within a static framework; as 
such investment decisions with a horizon beyond the current period (i.e. approximately 12 
months or a single production cycle) will not be investigated. 
Consider an agricultural household producing a single crop, , from multiple inputs, . The 
transformation of inputs into agricultural outputs tends to occur with considerable biological 
time lags. The production possibilities are represented by the technology , where 
 represents  non-negative inputs (e.g. labor and fertilizer) and  is a non-negative 
representation of crop output. The prices of inputs and outputs are assumed to be 
exogenously determined,  and  respectively. Fixed factors of production, such as land 
and physical capital2, are represented by . Profit, π, is defined as the difference between 
the gross revenue generated by the agricultural household and the variable costs incurred. 
                                                          
1 A complete and rigorous mathematical exposition of credit rationing in agriculture is beyond the scope of this paper. For 
rigorous static and dynamic treatises on the subject see Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995, pp.133-151), Petrick (2004, pp.79-85), 
respectively. 
2 “[Physical capital or] capital goods are machines of one sort or another: tractors, buildings, computer or whatever” (Varian 
2010, 333). 
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There is a timing mismatch between when capital investment3 is required and when the 
realization of returns is expected, which may result in a funding gap or liquidity problem. 
While inputs require financing at the start of the production period, outputs are only available 
at the end of the production cycle. Therefore, access to credit may enable farmers to 
overcome liquidity problems and make essential investments in working capital. 
Access to credit and borrowing activity is constrained by an exogenously determined credit 
limit , which represents the supply of credit available to a particular loan applicant. 
According to Feder et al (1990, p.1151), credit rationing may result in liquidity being a 
binding constraint on agricultural operations. The extent of the quality, volumes, and use of 
inputs may thus be constrained by the extent of access to credit. Consequently, as the output 
of a borrower’s production activities is a function of the inputs available, the income and 
profit available to a credit constrained borrower is expected to be constrained at suboptimal 
levels. 
Petrick (2002, p.4) captures the consumption side of the agricultural household by defining a 
catchall variable encapsulating the full liquidity contribution of the farm, ; with  
representing agricultural business owner and farm household characteristics, for example 
number of dependents, gender, age, schooling, and agricultural experience. While the 
liquidity contribution implies net directional flows from the farm to the household, it does not 
preclude net flows from the household to the farm. 
The household may further enhance production by making use of its available initial liquidity 
endowment, , and any exogenous net transfers, , including government grants and 
subsidies; it is assumed that they are maintained at constant levels. In the absence of credit, 
the household would thus make use of its available initial liquidity endowment and 
endogenous net transfers to support production and consumption activity. 
In the event that the initial endowments are inadequate, the funding gap may be addressed 
through the use of credit. The amount of credit required to fill the funding gap is implicitly 
interpreted as the demand for credit. The combination of access to credit, endowments, and 
exogenous transfers provides the household with sufficient liquid resources to service the 
production needs of the farm and cater to the consumption needs of the household. 
                                                          
3 Capital in this instance is pecuniary in nature. 
 
 
 25 
It is assumed that the household’s objective is to maximize current period profit with respect 
to decisions about input and output quantities, and subject to a technology constraint and a 
budget constraint. The constrained maximization problem may be summarized as follows: 
            (1) 
Subject to the following constraints: 
      Production technology    (2) 
 
 
 Budget constraint    (3) 
The Lagrangian corresponding to the constrained maximization problem is as follows: 
    (4) 
The first order conditions of the optimization problem are: 
            (5) 
           (6) 
            (7) 
The derivative of the Lagrangian, with respect to the credit constraint is: 
              (8) 
The multiplier η provides a measure of the impact of a change in the constraint on the 
optimal value of the objective function. In this case, η represents the marginal impact of 
credit, , when the agricultural household’s profit is maximized. Hence, here: 
              (9) 
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Given the inequality constraint presented above (3), the Kuhn Tucker conditions are used: 
             (10) 
         (11) 
        (12) 
We proceed by considering the Kuhn Tucker conditions, and in particular the new condition 
presented (12), which states that at least one of (10) or (11) must be zero, so that the product 
should equate to zero; this condition is referred to as the complementary slackness constraint. 
This condition yields the following three cases: 
Case 1:  Unconstrained 
Case 2:  Non-binding constraint 
Case 3:   Binding liquidity constraint 
For an unconstrained agricultural household (Case 1) or one where liquidity is not a binding 
constraint (Case 2), the demand for credit is satisfactorily met by adequate supply, while non-
borrowers elect to voluntarily withdraw from the market for credit. Thus, the marginal effect 
of a change in the credit limit on profit is zero: 
             
 (13) 
When the credit constraint is binding (Case 3), inefficiency is introduced into the agricultural 
production process by way of the multiplier η; this is the case that we are interested in. As a 
credit constrained producer, the household behaves as if it were maximizing profits, with the 
reduced form model presented as follows: 
          (14) 
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A change in output prices impacts output value and influences output quantity. While the 
former has a direct effect on profits, ceteris paribus, the latter has an indirect impact on 
profits as the farm is induced to adjust output to exploit the price increase. The indirect effect 
of a price change is assumed to be negligible, allowing the use of Hoteling’s Lemma (Varian 
1992, pp. 43-45) to take advantage of the direct price effect in order to derive output supply. 
Given the profit function, we may apply Hoteling’s Lemma in order to deduce the output 
supply equation: 
         (15) 
The result is generalizable to the multiple-output case. As such, the product of and 
exogenous prices  represents gross revenue. Ceteris paribus, a change in gross revenue 
results in a one-to-one change in profits, in the same direction. Given that we assume prices 
to be exogenously determined the multiplier η represents the marginal productivity of capital, 
ceteris paribus: 
             (16)
 
Therefore, the marginal impact of a change in the credit constraint, , is expected to affect 
gross revenue in the same manner as its effect on profits. 
2.5 Empirical literature 
A seminal paper by Feder et al (1990, p.1152) studies the impact of credit on Chinese 
agricultural productivity, based on a randomly selected cross-sectional dataset of 200 
households. It was found that enhanced credit availability, to credit constrained households, 
would result in improvements in the overall welfare of agricultural households in China; as a 
result of increased consumption and enhanced input use into production. In particular, it was 
reported that a 1% increase in formal credit (from the average level of liquidity) would result 
in a 0.04% improvement in gross agricultural output (p.1156). This finding suggests that 
credit was not entirely allocated towards productive activities; rather a significant portion 
may have been reallocated to consumption and investment activities. Although the welfare of 
agricultural households would be enhanced from improved access to credit, the fungibility of 
formal credit undermines the underlying motivation for the extension of agricultural credit. 
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The aforementioned paper represents a departure from the classical empirical literature of 
credit markets, premising the impact analysis on the basis that credit rationing as a natural 
equilibrium phenomenon. Another significant development made by the study lies in its early 
use of specific, household-level survey data for direct elicitation of the credit constraint 
status. As opposed to delineating credit constraints by credit participation status, this study 
classified agricultural households as credit constrained if their survey response indicated a 
desire for more credit or an inability to participate in credit. Further, the study propagated the 
use of the endogenous switching regression model for the estimation of credit constraint 
status and its effects. 
Foltz (2004, pp.229-230) investigates credit rationing and its impact on agricultural 
profitability and investment using a randomly selected sample of 142 farmers in Tunisia. 
Credit constraint status is elicited by whether a household would take on a new loan, if it 
were offered by a supplier of capital; placing the emphasis of the study on supply-side 
constraints involuntarily imposed by lenders. It was found that credit rationing had an 
adverse impact on profitability, measured by net revenues, however there was no significant 
effect on investment. 
Using a randomly selected sample of 464 semi-commercial farms engaged in crop production 
or livestock rearing, Petrick (2002; 2004) conducted comprehensive microeconometric 
analyses of credit rationing in Poland. The studies differ in their application of the 
agricultural household model. While the former constrains the scope of the study to the 
production side, the latter explicitly captures the consumption behavior of farm households in 
its theoretical framework. The distinct objective of both studies was to investigate whether 
government interventions in rural credit markets, in the form of interest rate subsidies, are 
justifiable as a means to improve welfare in the Polish agricultural sector.  This would be 
achieved by empirically determining the marginal contribution of credit on agricultural 
households that are credit constrained, based on subsamples of 43 and 41 observations for the 
2002 and 2004 studies, respectively. 
The evidence unanimously suggests that credit constraints have a significant impact on 
output supply. The earlier study reported a 190 percent marginal contribution from an extra 
unit of credit offered at an average annual rate of 10 percent (Petrick 2002, p.12); while the 
later study reported that the average farm household was willing to incur an interest charge of 
209 percent of principal for additional credit, despite effective interest rates being only 13 
percent, on average (Petrick 2004, pp.95-99). 
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Guirkinger and Boucher (2008, pp.295-299) use a sample of 443 farm households in Peru, 
from a panel dataset covering the period 1997 to 2003, to investigate how constraints in 
formal sector credit impact farm productivity. The study contributes to the empirical 
literature on credit rationing by adopting a broader definition of credit constraints, which 
encapsulates both supply-side and demand-side constraints.  It is found that the productivity 
of agricultural households in the sample would be enhanced by 26% if all formal credit 
constraints were eliminated, particularly quantity and risk constraints. It is postulated that 
disregard for constraints other than those caused by quantity rationing may result in the 
impact of credit constraints on economic outcomes being understated (p.306). 
A nationally representative dataset is used by Ali et al (2014, pp.1-2) to investigate the 
impact of credit constraints on Rwandan agricultural households. The study focuses on semi-
formal4 suppliers of capital to directly, and comprehensively, elicit credit constraint status. 
The motivation for framing the study around credit from the semi-formal sector stems from 
the observation that formal credit represents a small portion of sources of borrowings and 
informal sector credit is primarily used for activities other than agricultural investment. It is 
found that credit constraints inhibit agricultural production, measured by the value of crop 
output per hectare. Focusing on supply-side constraints, it was found that the provision of 
USD100 additional credit would, on average, be expected to result in an 8.9% improvement 
in agricultural production. Incorporating both demand- and supply-side constraints, it is 
demonstrated that the elimination of credit constraints would result in a 17% increase in the 
gross output value of agricultural households in Rwanda (pp.11-13). 
Winter-Nelson and Temu (2005, pp.868-870) use a randomly selected sample of 250 farmers 
to examine the impact of liquidity constraints on coffee producers in Tanzania, where farmers 
self-identify as liquidity constrained. It is noted that access to finance is necessary, but not 
sufficient, to infer the relaxation of liquidity constraints. The study reports that enhanced 
access to financing would have a significant impact on production, from more effective use 
of current inputs and an increased opportunity to purchase productivity-enhancing inputs. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that increased access to credit may contribute favorably to the 
alleviation of poverty and the realization of inclusive growth. Despite the limited 
representation of the broader economy, this study provides a benchmark for the empirical 
estimation of credit constraints and its impacts in the context of Tanzania. 
                                                          
4 Semi-formal financial institutions include cooperatives, input suppliers, micro finance institutions, and non-governmental 
organizations. 
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In Malawi, in order to investigate the impact of access to microcredit on various agricultural 
household welfare measures, namely productivity, incomes, and food security, Diagne and 
Zeller (2004, pp.62-68) branch away from the conventional approach of estimating the 
marginal effects of credit outstanding or credit programme participation. Instead, the study 
develops a novel approach that operationalizes access to credit by making use of the credit 
limit available to the borrower; hence the impacts of increases in this limit are of particular 
interest. Based on a sample of 404 households the findings of the study suggest that 
agricultural households in Malawi are typically credit constrained, however participation in 
microcredit may not necessarily facilitate enhancements in living standards and the 
alleviation of poverty (pp.100-109). Diagne and Zeller argue that while improvements in the 
credit limit may enhance the welfare of a household, participation in credit, with its 
consequential principal repayments and interest obligations, may result in the erosion of gains 
to the net income of the household. 
2.6 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter summarizes relevant theoretical and empirical literature on credit rationing in 
developing markets. Distinctions are drawn between key concepts in the credit rationing 
literature, followed by an investigation of the causes and consequences of credit rationing. 
Thereafter, a structured investigation of the conceptual framework underpinning this study is 
explored; and lastly, key findings from the empirical literature are highlighted. 
We define credit rationing as a phenomenon represented by an excess demand for credit; and 
further define credit constraints as experienced by economic agents and their limitations in 
accessing or participating in credit. The conventional classical economic notions of 
equilibrium price setting and the efficient allocation of resources are demonstrated to be 
inappropriate in the context of asymmetric information, particularly with regards to 
explaining rationing in credit markets. 
The role that adverse selection, moral hazard, and enforcement challenges play in explaining 
credit rationing as an equilibrium condition is investigated. It is established that imperfect 
and costly information enable credit-rationing behaviour, which undermines the social 
welfare and development goals of society. Further, the impact of credit constraints on 
productivity is explored in the context of the agricultural household model. 
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We posit that the simultaneity of decision-making may contribute to the misallocation of 
resources as a result of credit constraints being experienced and non-separable decisions 
being encouraged. It is argued that binding credit constraints may result in underinvestment 
in farm production, which would ultimately diminish the earning potential of an agricultural 
business. 
The empirical literature places emphasis on supply-side constraints and is somewhat 
inconsistent with regards to approach and evaluation of the impact of credit constraints on 
agricultural productivity. The relaxation of credit constraints is evidenced to aid the short-
term operational needs of farmers. However, the fungibility of formal credit may undermine 
the intention underlying increased access to finance. 
The provision of interest rate subsidies does not necessarily translate into the enhanced 
allocation of credit, which may result from a failure to address information asymmetries. In 
addition to quantity constraints, considerations of a broader definition of credit constraints 
that takes into account transaction cost and risk constraints provides support that the 
elimination of constraints may enhance productivity. 
The productivity or welfare of farm households is not necessarily enhanced by access to or 
the provision of microcredit, as transaction costs and small loan amounts may sustain credit 
ration behaviour. Improved access to liquidity was found to enhance productivity, and 
contribute favourably to the alleviation of poverty and inequality. 
In light of the reviewed body of knowledge, this study seeks to address the limited empirical 
evidence on the impact of credit constraints within the context of Tanzania, with a particular 
focus on providing a nationally representative perspective of credit rationing and its effects. 
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Chapter 3. Tanzania's farm sector and rural credit market 
3.1 Introduction 
The following chapter will present an overview of the agricultural sector in Tanzania and is 
organized in three main sections. The second section describes the macroeconomic 
performance of the sector with regards to labour, gross domestic product (GDP), and export 
considerations; in addition to the gross production, harvested area and yield across various 
food and cash crops. Section three provides an exposition that systematically follows the 
evolution of the agricultural policy landscape in Tanzania from post-independence and the 
Arusha declaration period, through the reform era, and towards the current development 
agendas pertaining to the sector and it’s financing. The fourth section describes the major 
characteristics of credit markets in Tanzania. In particular, an emphasis is placed on 
understanding the formal, semi-formal, and informal financial institutions responsible for 
supporting the activities of the sector and enabling its transformation into a modern, 
commercial vehicle for the realization of poverty alleviation and the improvement of living 
standards. Section five concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Performance of the Agricultural sector 
The agricultural sector contributed 77% of the economically active population in 2007, which 
marginally declined to around 74% in 2014; over the period the sector accounted for an 
average of 76% of the labour force (FAOSTAT 2015c, 2015d). Between 2007 and 2014, 
annual average growth of the economically active population exceeded growth of the total 
population, 3.3% and 3.0% respectively (FAOSTAT 2015e). Annual growth of the 
economically active population in agriculture averaged at 2.6% over the period. 
The percentage distribution of gross domestic product by economic activity is presented in 
Table 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing is the largest contributor to the GDP of 
Tanzania, accounting for 23.8% of economic output in 2013, however this share has been 
declining steadily, falling from 27.3% in 2008 (NBS and MoF, 2014).  Annual growth of the 
agricultural sector averaged around 3.9% from 2007 to 2013, while the total GDP growth 
over the period averaged 6.3%.
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Table 1. Percentage distribution of GDP at 2007 Prices (%) 
Economic Activity 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing 26.8 27.3 27.2 26.3 25.2 24.8 23.8 
Industry and construction 20.2 20.4 20.0 20.5 21.3 21.0 21.8 
Mining and quarrying 3.5 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.3 
Manufacturing 7.0 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.3 
Electricity, gas and water supply 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Construction 7.9 8.2 7.5 7.8 8.9 8.7 9.6 
Services 47.4 46.8 47.0 47.6 47.8 48.8 48.3 
Commerce 11.7 11.8 11.4 11.7 12.0 11.9 11.6 
Transport and communications 8.2 8.1 8.7 9.4 9.2 9.7 9.9 
Financial intermediation, real estate and business services 13.0 13.1 13.4 13.7 13.6 13.7 13.4 
Goverments, community, social and personal services 14.6 13.8 13.5 12.7 13.0 13.5 13.4 
Net taxes and FISM 5.6 5.5 5.8 5.6 5.7 5.4 6.0 
GDP at 2007 prices 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: NBS and MOF (2015)        
Table 1. Percentage distribution of GDP at 2007 Prices, 2007 - 2013 
Figure 2. GDP Share of agricultural sub-sectors, 2007 - 2013 
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Figure 3. Annual GDP growth of agricultural sub-sectors, 2007 - 2013 
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Over the same period, the minimum agricultural GDP growth was 2.7% in 2009/10, while 
total GDP growth reflected its period low in 2011/12 at a relatively higher annual growth of 
5.2%. The agricultural sectors maximum growth rate was 7.5% in 2007/08, compared to 
maximum growth of the overall economy at 7.9% in 2010/11. Since 2007, total GDP has 
grown by approximately 1.44x, while agricultural GDP has grown by 1.28x. 
The declining share of agricultural GDP in the economy is attributable to the weak growth of 
the sector and considerable growth in other segments of the economy. In particular the 
transport and communications sector has exhibited an average annual growth rate of 7.7%, 
while exhibiting an increase in share of GDP from 8.2% in 2007 to 9.9% in 2013. The 
construction industry grew at 6.7% over the period and accounted for 9.6% of total GDP in 
2013, up from 7.9% of total GDP in 2007. The manufacturing sector grew at an average 
annual rate of 6.0% over the period, followed closely by the electricity, gas, and water supply 
sector, which grew at an average of 5.9%. 
The percentage distribution of agricultural GDP and growth of GDP sub-sectors are presented 
in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. The crop sub-sector accounts for the largest share of 
agricultural GDP at about 52.3% in 2013, followed by the livestock sub-sector at 33.3%. The 
former grew at an annual average growth rate of 4.9% between 2007 and 2013, which 
contributed to the decrease in its contribution to total GDP from 13.5% to 12.4% over the 
period. Growth in the crop sub-sector was characterized by wide variability and ranged from 
3.5% to 7.8% over the period. 
The livestock sub-sector saw a more moderate decline in its contribution to Agricultural GDP 
from 9.2% in 2007 to 7.9% in 2013. The forestry and hunting sub-sector contributed a 
modest 2.1% to total GDP in 2013, while the fishing sub-sector accounted for 1.5% of total 
GDP. 
Figure 4 below presents the value of selected major exports from Tanzania. Major 
agricultural exports accounted for about 32.4% of total exports in 2007 before sharply 
declining to 21.3% in 2011, thereafter rebounding to 25.1% in 2013 (UNCTADStat 2015).  
Total exports were multiplied by 2.4x from 2007 to 2013, however agricultural exports grew 
1.8x. Minerals fuels and machinery and transport equipment have primarily driven growth in 
exports, and were multiplied by 3.3x and 3.5x respectively. 
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Figure 4. Major Tanzanian Exports, 2007 - 2013 
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Figure 4. Major Tanzanian Exports
selected product groups  
Despite considerable growth in mineral fuels exports, its share of total exports increased from 
a modest 2.0% in 2007 to 2.7% in 2013. Machinery and transport equipment accounted for 
4.8% of total exports in 2013, up from 3.3% in 2007. Crude materials and inedibles 
accounted for 21.7% of total exports in 2007, rising to 28.9% in 2011 and thereafter 
dampening to 22.3%. Crude materials grew by 2.4x over the period. Manufactured goods 
exports were multiplied by 2.3x from 2007 to 2013, and accounted for 13% of total exports in 
2013. 
Food crops include maize, rice, sorghum, millet, cassava, beans, potatoes, and sweet 
potatoes; and cash crops include: cotton, coffee, tea, sisal, tobacco, and cashew nuts. 
Based on FAOSTAT data presented in Figure 5, maize and cassava represent the largest 
shares of gross food crop production5 in Tanzania with production of 5.36 and 5.40 million 
metric tons, respectively (FAOSTAT 2015b). The share of maize production marginally 
increased from 25.5% in 2007 to 26.6% in 2013, however the share of cassava production 
declined from 36.3% to 26.8% over the same period. Growth in potato, millet and rice 
production were the major contributors to annual average food production growth from 2007 
to 2013, at 18.4%, 14.7%, and 13.8% respectively. Maize production grew at an average 
annual growth rate of 10.5% over the period, while cassava production grew at -1.0%. 
                                                          
5 Gross food crop production is calculated as the aggregation of available production data for maize, rice, sorghum, millet, 
cassava, beans, potatoes, and sweet potatoes. 
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Figure 5. Food crop production, 2007 - 2013 
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Figure 5. Food crop production
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Figure 6. Cash crop production, 2004 - 2013 
Cotton accounts for the largest share of gross cash crop production6 in Tanzania with 352,162 
metrics tons, followed by the production of cashew nuts and tobacco with 122,274 and 
120,000 metric tons respectively (FAOSTAT 2015b). Figure 6 presents cash crop production 
from 2007 to 2012. The share of cotton production has exhibited persistent variability over 
the period, ranging from 30.7% to 58.5%, in 2012 cotton accounted for 49% of gross cash 
crop production. The share of cashew nut production experienced volatility, ultimately 
declining from 20.4% in 2007 to 17% in 2012, while the share of tobacco production 
increased from 11.1% in 2007 to 24.4% in 2011, thereafter dampening to 16.7% in 2012. 
                                                          
6 Gross cash crop production is calculated as the aggregation of available production data for production of cotton, coffee, 
tea, sisal, tobacco, and cashew nuts 
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Food crop production increased almost 1.4x between 2007 and 2013, growing at an average 
annual rate of 13.8%. Potato production was a major contributor and was multiplied by 2.7x 
over the period, as shown in Figure 7; followed by sweet potato, rice and maize production 
which were multiplied by 2.3x, 1.6x, and 1.5x, respectively. Cash crop production increased 
1.6x between 2007 and 2012, driven mainly by growth in Tobacco and Cotton (see Figure 8). 
Production of tobacco was multiplied by 2.4x, while cotton production increased by 1.8x. 
Figure 7. Growth in food crop production, 2007 - 2012 
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Figure 8. Growth in cash crop production
Source: Author's calculations based on FAOSTAT (2015b)
Note: Details on production indices available in Appendix Table 6.  
Figure 8. Growth in cash crop production, 2007 - 2012 
Table 2 below presents a summary of production quantities, area under harvest, and yield for 
selected food and cash crops. By 2013, the harvested area under maize production was 4.1 
million hectares, up 1.6x from 2.6 million hectares in 2007, as shown in Figure 9 (FAOSTAT 
2015a). The harvested area under bean production increase 1.4x over the period from 
approximately 918,742 hectares to 1.3 million hectares; followed by cassava harvested area 
which grew 1.2x to 950,000 and rice harvest area, which grew 1.7x to 928,273 hectares.
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Table 2. Production summary 
Year 
Area 
('000s ha) 
Yield 
(Kg/Ha) 
Production 
('000s metric tons) 
  Food crops 
 
CerealsA 
2007 4,376 1,435 6,280 
2013 6,095 1,428 8,706 
Average 5,411 1,384 7,490 
  Roots and tubersB 
2007 1,300 5,515 7,171 
2013 1,828 5,616 10,268 
Average 1,613 5,403 8,716 
  PulsesC 
2007 919 968 889 
2013 1,300 885 1,150 
Average 1,016 861 875 
  
  
Cash crops 
Cotton 
2007 450 446 201 
2013 490 724 355 
Average 453 623 282 
  Beverage cropsD 
2007 234 342 80 
2012 131 755 99 
Average 205 423 87 
  Cashew nuts 
2007 93 996 93 
2012 411 298 122 
Average 222 442 98 
  Tobacco 
2007 44 1,150 51 
2012 156 772 120 
Average 92 858 79 
  Sisal 
2007 42 738 31 
2012 58 443 26 
Average 52 525 27 
Source: FAOSTAT (2015a, 2015b) 
Note: Averages calculated over the period 2007 to 2013; where 2013 data 
is unavailable average is reflected for the period between 2007 and 2012. 
A. Cereals: maize, rice, sorghum, and millet 
B. Roots and tubers: cassava, potatoes, sweet potatoes 
C. Pulses: beans 
D. Beverage crops: tea, coffee 
Table 2. Production summary (Area, Yield, and Production) 
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According to FAOSTAT (2015a) cotton production accounted for 490,000 hectares under 
production in 2013, up from 450,000 hectares in 2007 as can be seen by Figure 10. Cashew 
nuts and tobacco represented the largest growth in area harvested between 2007 and 2013, 
growing 4.4x and 3.5x respectively.  Over the period, the former grew from 93,000 to 
410,641 hectares under cultivation, while the latter grew from 44,000 hectares to 155,527 
hectares. 
Figure 9. Food crop area harvested, 2007 - 2013 
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Figure 9. Food crop area harvested
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Figure 10. Cash crop area harvested
Source: FAOSTAT (2015a)
Note: Details on area harvested available in Appendix Table 7.
 
Figure 10. Cash crop area harvested, 2007 - 2013 
Between 2007 and 2013, cassava and potatoes recorded the highest annual average yields 
amongst food crops, at 6,680 and 5,926 kg/ha respectively. Tea represented the highest cash 
crop yield growing approximately 6.3x between 2007 and 2012 from 1,398 to 8,759 kg/ha. 
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3.3 The evolution of agricultural policy in Tanzania 
Post-independence 
Agriculture has played a perennial role in the policy landscape of Tanzania since 
independence, in 1961. Despite the market for export crops maintaining its historically 
established control mechanisms, the market for grains was deregulated in the wake of 
independence (World Bank et al 2000, p.5). Smallholder farmers that were primarily engaged 
in semi-subsistence activities vastly dominated the sector; and the liberation government 
recognized cooperative7 societies as the primary vehicles for the realization of national 
development.  
Arusha declaration 
The 1967 Arusha Declaration was the major impetus for transforming Tanzania into a 
socialist state. The ideology of socialism was advocated as the basis for development, in 
conjunction with self-reliance and egalitarianism (TANU 1967). The Declaration prohibited 
the exploitation of one person by another. Hence, the major means of production were 
brought under the control and ownership of the public, through a democratically elected 
government and cooperative representatives. A massive nationalization programme drove 
rapid growth in the number and size of state owned enterprises and parastatal organizations. 
Limbu and Mashindano (2002, p.48) assert that the expansion of the public sector resulted in 
numerous employment opportunities for Tanzanians and increased the government’s 
capability for social service provision. 
The Declaration recognized agriculture as the basis for development and placed emphasis on 
the need to increase food and cash crop production in Tanzania (TANU 1967, p.14). It was 
envisioned that the priority objectives of poverty eradication and the improvement of living 
standards would be pursued by targeting the rural sector. The village replaced the cooperative 
as the primary vehicle in pursuit of rural development and would henceforth serve as a means 
to share basic resources amongst a group of smallholder farmers. Furthermore, the village 
structure was expected to enable cooperative agricultural production and enhance 
accessibility for social services.
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The policy environment, and the increased roles and responsibilities of the government, 
promoted the public sector while discouraging and effectively crowding out private sector 
activity. Limbu and Mashindano (2002, pp.45-50) argue that the implementation of the 
Arusha Declaration was undermined by a shortage of skilled labour in the public sector, 
inadequate incentives, the pursuit of political agendas ahead of economic interests, and the 
bureaucracy inherent in decision-making. Edwards (2012, p.21) suggests that the 
villagization agenda was hampered by the unwillingness of peasant farmers to move from 
their more fertile farmlands into planned villages where they would be assigned new land. 
The socialist movement culminated in periods of crisis and stagnation. The economy 
contracted and exhibited rampant inflation, exacerbated by a widening fiscal deficit, 
restrictive import policies, and exchange rate controls (World Bank et al 2000, p.6). The 
public sector was plagued with financial mismanagement, and misappropriation of funds, 
while agricultural markets were adversely affected by the ailing economy. 
The reform era 
According to Edwards (2012, p.28), domestic policy was unsuccessfully introduced in the 
early 1980s in an effort to reform and stabilise the economy. From 1986, economic reform 
programmes supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were 
adopted. With the intention of addressing the numerous economic problems, the reforms 
promoted a shift in the economy from socialism and central planning towards market 
orientation. The agricultural sector was restructured as a result of the privatization of 
production, distribution, and importation activities. Government authorities’ price-setting role 
was revoked and subsidies were eliminated on key farm inputs. The diminished role of the 
reform government in agricultural development may have hampered the rural development 
efforts of the liberation and socialist movements. 
The current policy framework acknowledges that agricultural development is constrained by 
persistent underinvestment in the sector and refreshes the government's long and medium 
term goals (URT, 2006, p.7). Commercialization and transformation of the sector is 
advocated for across the value chain, from low to high productivity activities, with a 
particular emphasis on enhancing food security and improving farm incomes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 A cooperative is defined by the ILO (2002) as “an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled 
enterprise” 
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Long and medium term development agendas 
The Tanzania Development Vision 2025 aims to guide the efforts and resources of the nation 
towards the sustainable eradication of poverty and the improvement of living standards over 
the long term (URT 1999, p.2). The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty 
(NSGRP)8 represents the medium term framework for the implementation of the vision, and 
is underpinned by the pursuit of inclusive growth, supported by good economic governance 
and enhanced accountability MoFEA (2010, p.35). The Planning Commission proclaims the 
extension of the pre-reform basis for development beyond the rural agricultural sector (URT 
1999, p.22). Semi-industrialization and the diversification of economic activity have been 
advanced as the primary means to improve productivity and competitiveness across all 
sectors of the economy. 
Sector specific policy landscape 
The Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) aims to support the development 
endeavours of Tanzania by creating an enabling and conducive policy environment for 
enhanced activity in the sector, while the Agricultural Sector Development Programme 
(ASDP) operationalizes and supports the strategy (URT 2001, p.12; URT 2006, p.8). The 
ASDS and ASDP position the sector as the primary vehicle for tackling rural poverty, 
recognizing the ongoing and significant role that agriculture is expected to play in the pursuit 
of economic development. The Kilimo Kwanza9 resolution aims to coordinate private and 
public stakeholders to accelerate the efforts of the ASDP, through various policies and 
strategic interventions in the agricultural sector (TNBC 2009; Shamte 2009, p.5).  
The aim of the National Agricultural Policy (NAP) is to advance the agricultural sector 
towards being a modern, commercial driver of the economy that is efficient, productive, 
profitable, and competitive (MoAFSC 2013, pp.8-9). The NAP supplements the ASDS 
vision, with a particular emphasis on empowering the farmer. Furthermore, the policy 
advocates for the government to improve the capacity and coordination efforts of financial 
institutions and intermediaries to improve awareness, access, and accessibility of finance to 
farmers in order to better tackle agricultural development.  
                                                          
8 In Kiswahili, Mpango wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini Tanzania (MKUKUTA) 
9 In English, Agriculture first 
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3.4 Characteristics of credit markets in Tanzania 
Table 3. Providers of financial intermediation services 
Formal sector Semi-formal sector Informal sector 
Central bank Savings and credit cooperatives Savings associations 
   Banks Multiple cooperatives Combined savings and credit 
associations – rotating savings 
and credit associations and 
variants 
Commercial banks 
 
Merchant banks Credit unions 
Savings banks 
  Rural banks Cooperative quasi-banks  Village community banks  
(VICOBAs) Postal savings banks 
 Labour banks Employee savings funds 
 Cooperative banks 
 
Informal financial firms 
 
Village banks Indigenous bankers 
Development banks 
 
Finance companies 
State-owned Development projects Investment companies 
Private 
  
 
Registered self-help groups and 
savings clubs 
Nonregistered self-help groups 
Other nonbank institutions 
 Finance companies 
 
Individual moneylenders 
Term-lending institutions Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) 
Commercial 
  Building societies and  
credit unions 
 Noncommercial  
(friends, neighbours, relative) Microfinance Institutions 
  
Traders and shopkeeper 
Contractual savings institutions 
  Pension funds 
 
NGO 
Insurance companies 
     Markets 
  Stocks 
  Bonds 
  Source: FAO (1995, 5), Bee (2009, p.144) 
Table 3. Providers of financial intermediation services 
 
A country’s financial sector can be classified into formal, semi-formal, and informal 
institutions, according to the legal frameworks governing lender and borrower behaviour 
(FAO 1995, pp.2-10). Table 3 presents a summary of the various financial institutions; 
notwithstanding, financial activity may permeate across these classifications. Formal 
institutions in Tanzania are licensed by the government and subject to regulation and 
supervision, whereas informal institutions are outside the scope of government oversight. 
While the former are subject to stringent operating and risk management practices, the latter 
typically operate on the basis of familiarity and close proximity between lenders and 
borrowers. Semi formal institutions are beyond the scope of direct government regulation, 
however they may be subject to indirect oversight through various public agencies or entities 
(Ledgerwood 1999, pp.12-13). 
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Since the adoption of financial sector reforms in 1991, the Tanzanian financial sector has 
experienced considerable growth (TNCFI 2013, p.2). The number of banks has grown from 4 
to 52 and the insurance sector has expanded its coverage from 1 public institution to 27 
private insurers. As of June 2013, there were approximately 5,559 Savings and Credit 
Cooperative Societies (SACCOS) and 170 Non-Government Organizations and companies 
providing credit. 
Commercial banks, public finance institutions, and insurance companies represent the formal 
financial institutions in Tanzania. According to MoAFSC (2013, p.4) commercial banks 
disburse over 90% of the institutional credit allocated to the agricultural sector, with the 
balance primarily accommodated by community banks and cooperatives. Despite this 
significant relative contribution, formal institutional lending to the sector remains low, 
absolutely. 
Table 4. Percentage distribution of commercial banks domestic lending by economic activity (%) 
Economic Activity 2010  2011 2012 2013 2014 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing 9.7 11.8 11.1 10.7 9.4 
Agriculture, Hunting, and Forestry 8.8 10.7 10.6 10.4 9.1 
Fishing 0.9 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.3 
Industry and construction 22.7 22.6 22.8 24.1 23.6 
Mining and Quarrying 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.5 
Manufacturing 13.9 12.8 11.7 11.7 11.6 
Electricity, gas and water 5.0 4.7 5.6 6.2 5.1 
Building and Construction 3.2 4.4 4.8 5.2 5.3 
Services 67.6 65.6 66.1 65.1 67.0 
Commerce 23.3 26.8 26.8 26.7 26.3 
Transport, storage and communications 9.4 7.8 7.5 7.5 8.0 
Financial intermediation, real estate and business services 4.5 6.3 6.8 6.7 7.5 
Goverments, community, social and personal services 30.3 24.8 25.1 24.2 25.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: BoT (2015) 
Note: Details on commercial banks domestic lending by economic activity available in Appendix Tables 9 - 10  
Table 4. Percentage distribution of Commercial Banks domestic lending by economic activity, 2010 - 2014 
The percentage distribution of commercial bank lending in the economy is presented in Table 
4. In 2014, agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing accounted for only 9.4% of total 
commercial banks domestic lending, declining from 11.8% in 2011 This low contribution of 
formal credit to the agricultural sector is complemented by substantial allocations to other 
areas of the economy. The largest contribution of commercial lending went to trade (25%), 
followed by social and personal services (21.0%) and manufacturing (11.6%). 
Credit to the agricultural sector grew at an annual average rate of 21.7% from 2010 to 2013, 
buoyed by outstanding growth of 56.0% from 2010 to 2011.  In comparison, the real estate 
and leasing sector grew at an average annual rate of 59.3% from 2010 to 2013, followed by 
mining and quarrying (55.6%), and tourism (43.7%). 
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The government has established various public institutions to facilitate the provision of 
agricultural credit (OECD 2013, p.188-190). The Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) and 
Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank (TADB) are state-owned banks mandated with the 
provision of development finance. Amongst other things, the TIB is involved in the provision 
of concessionary short to medium term agricultural loans. The TABD is specifically aligned 
to Kilimo Kwanza and aims to coordinate and mobilize financial resources from private and 
public sector stakeholders towards various suppliers of credit in the agricultural sector. In 
addition, the agricultural input trust fund (AITF) provides an alternative avenue for short-
term input financing. 
Informal financial institutions in Tanzania are represented by various savings and credit 
groups, namely: village savings and loans associations (VSLAs), village community banks 
(VICOBAs), rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), customers, and family and 
friends, amongst others. 
VSLAs and VICOBA are informal village-based microcredit providers that service the 
liquidity needs of the communities in which they operate. ROSCAs are contributory schemes 
wherein members’ periodic contributions are distributed on a rotational basis. These informal 
institutions do not rely on formal agreements and enforcement mechanisms. Instead, the 
borrowers’ reputations, the expected reciprocation of fellow members, and the incentive for 
community-based enforcement are some mechanisms used to enhance the likelihood of 
repayment (OECD 2013, p.184-186; FAO 1995, p.8). 
Semi-formal institutions include savings and credit cooperative societies (SACCOS) and 
other cooperatives, which typically condition borrowers’ access to credit on the savings 
contributed. SACCOS play a significant role in the provision of financial intermediation 
services to the rural sector due to their extensive reach and proximity to community members 
(Wangwe 2004, pp.6-9). These entities rely on social capital and community pressure to 
ensure the repayment of loans and enforcement of agreements. 
In this regard, SACCOS may serve as conduits for formal financial institutions looking to 
leverage off their local presence and extensive knowledge of the rural sector. While the 
government regulates formal institutions, the regulatory exemption of SACCOS provides 
scope for lending malpractice and mismanagement. 
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Semi-formal institutions also include financial non-governmental organisations and 
government-mandated institutions (Bee 2009, pp.159-163). In Tanzania, The Promotion of 
Rural Initiatives and Development Enterprise (PRIDE), the Foundation for International 
Community Assistance (FINCA), and the Small Industries Development Organization 
(SIDO) aim to address the financing gap and developmental challenges experienced by the 
rural poor and small and medium enterprises. 
Typically, these entities are legally precluded from taking deposits, hence their primary 
activities are usually confined to the provision and promotion of externally sourced micro-
credit; however, their activities have evolved towards the mobilization of savings through 
village and community banking models. 
The Tanzania National Council for Financial Inclusion suggests that the aversion for 
investment in the agricultural sector is reinforced by uncertainty about the macroeconomic 
environment and the perceived associated risks (TNCFI 2013, pp.11-12). In Tanzania, the 
legal and regulatory framework is characterized by convoluted client on-boarding 
requirements and inadequate contract enforcement mechanisms. There is limited reach of the 
current financial market infrastructure, in addition to asymmetric information between 
lenders and borrowers concerning the potential risks of default and the complexity of 
financial products, respectively. Despite the rapid expansion of the financial sector, the 
agricultural sector is characterized by the proliferation of short-term credit facilities with 
limited offerings of longer-term financing (MoAFSC 2013, pp.21-22). Rural sector demand 
for formal financing solutions is considered to be inadequate to justify the costs of service 
provision; while transaction costs and collateral requirements are high where services are 
provided. 
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3.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter provided a comprehensive overview of the agricultural sector in Tanzania. The 
performance of the sector was evaluated across various dimensions and an exposition of 
financial institutions was undertaken, with a particular emphasis on the credit market. The 
policy environment governing agricultural development was explored, highlighting the 
evolution of agricultural policy in pursuit of long-term agricultural development. 
The agricultural sector contributes substantially to the economy of Tanzania, accounting for 
significant proportions of the gross domestic product and economically active population; 
however, the significance of the sector has been steadily declining. Food crops represent a 
significantly larger contribution to production output and area harvested relative to cash 
crops, with the former historically recording higher yields. Further, agricultural goods 
account for a large proportion of total exports; however the contribution has been moderated 
over time. 
Commercial banks characterize the formal financial institutions and serve as the primary 
financial intermediaries in Tanzania. The mission to promote savings and rural development 
characterizes semi-formal financial institutions, while informal institutions operate at the 
village or community level. The allocation of finance to the agricultural sector is hampered 
by instability in the macroeconomic outlook, perceived risks surrounding rural activity, and 
risk aversion towards the provision of finance beyond the short term. Complex regulation and 
inadequate enforcement mechanisms, in addition to the inappropriate provision of financing 
products and services, present barriers to the development of the agricultural sector. 
Tanzania evolved from a socialist state to a modern, liberalized regime wherein the focus 
shifted from the preservation of small-scale agricultural production at the village or 
community level to the modernization and commercialization of the sector. The policy 
landscape governing economic development has continually been intent on promoting 
agricultural development and realizing the economic development goals of poverty 
alleviation and the improvement of living standards. 
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Chapter 4. Research methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology that operationalizes the empirical approach 
undertaken by this study; and is organized into six distinct, yet unified main sections. The 
second section describes the data used in this study and the survey design that underlies the 
sampling approach. The third section presents the research approach; outlining the two 
distinct stages of the empirical strategy, which include the elicitation of credit constraint 
status and the subsequent investigation of its impact on agricultural productivity. The fourth 
section describes the estimation strategy and section five details the specification of the 
estimating equations. The sixth and seventh sections address the reliability, validity, and 
limitations presented by this study. 
4.2 Data and survey design 
Data 
This study uses secondary data from the 2011 Agriculture Finance Market Scoping Survey 
(AgFims). On behalf of the Financial Sector Deepening TrustTM (FSDT) and other 
stakeholders10, Synovate TanzaniaTM conducted the survey between April and September 
2011. The survey provides a nationally representative cross-sectional dataset of agricultural 
businesses in Tanzania; this study concerns itself with the sub-sample of agricultural 
producers. 
The full sample consists of 4,094 agricultural households, representing 519,358 agricultural 
businesses along the value chain; including 489,898 producers, 9,425 processors, and 20,035 
service providers. The National Agricultural Policy defines the agricultural sector to include 
crops, livestock, fisheries, and hunting (MoAFSC 2013, p.2) and the AgFims survey includes 
agricultural businesses engaged in the crop or livestock sub-sectors. These classifications 
describe the primary activity that an agricultural business would be engaged in, however this 
does not preclude involvement in more than one sub-sector across various parts of the value 
chain.
                                                          
10 The Gatsby Charitable Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. 
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For the purpose of this study the scope of the agricultural sector will be confined to the crop 
sub-sector; which includes 3,374 agricultural households representing 446,873 agricultural 
businesses. Hence, the subset under investigation does not include any processors or service 
providers. A large proportion of the agricultural businesses is captured when focusing on the 
crop sub-sector, thus a significant loss of representativeness is not expected. 
The AgFims survey includes detailed information on the nature, size, and sophistication of 
each agricultural business, resource endowments and accessibility, demographic 
characteristics, business activity and income, access to information, risk management 
practices, and obstacles to growth. Information about financial literacy and behaviour related 
to saving, borrowing, and investment activity is enumerated, in addition to perceptions about 
the corresponding financial markets. Furthermore, the survey captures information about loan 
applications and loan participation over the past 12 months; which may be used to classify 
agricultural businesses as constrained or unconstrained. 
Sampling frame 
Considerations of practical and economic feasibility constrain the collection of information 
on the whole population. A representative sample is a subset of a population of interest, 
which enables inferences to be made about the target population within resource, operational, 
and cost constraints. The sampling frame of a survey defines its potential coverage; and it is 
typically based on the most recent population census, which aims to collect information about 
all the households and individual household members of the population (Deaton 1997, p.10). 
The sampling frame adopted by the AgFims is based on the 2002 Tanzania Population and 
Housing Census (NBS 2011, p.3), which was the latest population census11 at the time the 
survey was conducted. During the nine-year time lapse between the Census and the AgFims 
survey, changes to the enumeration areas can be plausibly expected as a result of attrition, 
arising from births and deaths, migration, or redevelopment of particular geographic areas.  
Sampling error may arise as a sample is used instead of the whole population. The historical 
enumeration areas do not account for changes over time, which may result in sampling errors 
and unrepresentative samples being selected. In addition, the survey may be subject to 
selection bias, due to the sample frame not adequately capturing some part of the target 
population. 
                                                          
11 A population and housing consensus was conducted in 2012. 
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Survey designs that use the equal probability of selection method (EPSEM) maintain that 
each element of the target population has the same probability of being selected into the 
sample; consequently, every element has the same weight (Kish 1965, p20-21). If each 
population element does not have the same probability of being selected, sampling weights 
are necessary to adjust for the sample design and improve the accuracy and 
representativeness of sample estimates. Unequal selection probabilities imply that households 
in the selected sample represent different numbers of households in the population. Hence, 
observations in the sample are adjusted to represent the target population, using design 
weights based on the sample design (Deaton 1997, p.15). In addition to addressing the 
disproportionate probability of selection, sampling weights are necessary to address non-
response, and post-stratification. 
The Agricultural Financial Market Scoping survey employs a three stage stratified sample 
design, with disproportionate selection (NBS 2011, p.7-8). Assurance that the sample data is 
representative of the entire population of agricultural businesses in Tanzania is sought by 
accounting for the probability of inclusion at each stage of the sample design. In particular, 
the survey takes account of inclusion probabilities for: i) enumerator area selection, ii) the 
selection of households from selected enumerator areas and, iii) the inclusion of qualifying 
agricultural businesses from eligible households (NBS 2011, pp.10-11; YDC 2012, p.18). 
The primary sampling units (PSUs) selected at the first stage are the urban and rural 
enumeration areas. Enumeration areas represent the smallest operational units of land that a 
geographical area can be feasibly divided into for conducting a survey or census; in this case 
the enumeration areas are defined12 by the 2002 Census. This is to ensure that the sample 
selection is geographically representative of the country. 
The sampling frame is divided into homogenous subgroups, called strata, in preparation for 
the independent selection of enumeration areas within each stratum; in this case, the strata are 
defined to be consistent with the geographic domains of the sampling frame. Stratification 
may increase the precision of estimates and improve the representativeness of the sample by 
mitigating any potential sampling error inherent in the sample design. The sampler controls 
strata sizes, and disproportionate allocation may be used to ensure minimum sample sizes for 
subpopulations of interest. Furthermore, disproportionate stratification may be convenient 
and serve to minimize cost. 
                                                          
12 Operational units were defined “for each administrative region in the Mainland; Unguja and Pemba Islands in Zanzibar.” 
(NBS, p.3) 
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Systematic sampling is used to select enumeration areas within strata with probability 
proportional to size (PPS); the measure of size being the number of households. 
Synovate(2011b, p.5) defines a household as “a group of people who normally eat from the 
same pot.” In addition, implicit stratification is employed. Urban and rural geographical 
domains, region, district, and ward order enumeration areas within each stratum. This 
technique ensures adequate coverage of representative enumeration areas, as different criteria 
are expected to predominate across the various geographic domains and sub-domains. 
The total number of households in the  enumeration area that is found in the  stratum 
may be represented by , while the total number of households in the stratum is 
represented by . The probability of selection of an enumeration area  is reflected by the 
probability of selecting all the households in an enumeration area, in a particular stratum, 
from all the households in that stratum: 
             (17) 
A larger sample of enumeration areas in a stratum increases the probability that an 
enumeration area will be selected. Hence, the reported inclusion probability of enumeration is 
adjusted for the sample number of enumeration areas  in the stratum: 
            (18) 
At the second stage, households from the selected enumeration areas were systematically 
selected as the secondary sampling units (SSUs). Within each stratum, the listing of all 
households was done in a “serpentine” way to avoid clustering (Synovate 2011, pp.5-7). 
Households had to meet certain qualifying criteria to ensure that a sampling frame was 
defined for agricultural businesses with commercial potential. 
Agricultural businesses were defined to include agricultural producers, processors, and 
service providers; these could either be individuals or business entities. Producers had to be 
involved in semi-commercial activities, i.e. producing more for sale than consumption; 
hence, subsistence farmers were precluded from selection. Processors were responsible for 
the transformation of agricultural products sourced from producers, and service providers 
were responsible for the provision of services13 to producers and processors. 
                                                          
13 Services may include, but are not limited to, “input providers, information services, agricultural manufacturers, providers 
of agricultural equipment, professional service providers such as veterinarians, as well as traders such as wholesalers, 
retailers and middlemen.” (YDC 2012, p.12) 
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In particular, the income inclusion criteria for producers was that they earned US$60014 or 
more income per year, whereas the income of processors and service providers was 
benchmarked at US$1500 or more. For producers, the income threshold defined for inclusion 
as an agricultural business was described as the estimated amount required to service a micro-
finance loan of average size, without difficulty. The threshold for processors and service 
providers is expected to exceed average income earned by businesses of this nature in 
Tanzania. The basis of these estimations was not elaborated on further in the metadata 
In the event that a producer does not meet the income criteria they may still be selected based 
on farm size. In particular, farm households that made use of a minimum of 5 acres of land 
were included in the sample. The size criteria is concerned with access to land for operational 
use as opposed to mere land ownership; this implies an emphasis on productivity as opposed 
to mere control. 
The different income criteria suggest that the average processor or service provider created 
more value than the average producer. The wider income range, in conjunction with the 
additional qualifying criteria based on size, provides a broader scope for the selection of 
agricultural producers relative to other agricultural businesses. It is on this basis that this 
study confines its scope to the sub-sample of agricultural producers, in order to enable a 
certain degree of homogeneity within the population of interest. 
After systematically selecting qualifying households, the total number of households in the 
 enumeration area in the  stratum may be represented by . Let be the number of 
households selected from this updated list of qualifying households. Eight households are 
targeted from each enumeration area. The probability of selecting a qualifying household 
( ) from the updated sample of households in the  enumeration area is: 
            (19) 
At the third stage, household members were randomly selected as the ultimate sampling units 
(USUs).  In order to qualify the household member had to be involved in agricultural 
business and be at least 18 years old. In the event that there was only one qualifying 
household member they were selected by default. However, if there was more than one 
qualifying household member then participants were randomly selected15.  
                                                          
14 The 2011 per capita gross domestic product at current prices was reported at US$759.75 (IMF WEO, 2015). 
15 Selection was randomized using a Kish Grid (NBS 2011, p.8), which makes use of a random number table as a selection 
tool. 
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Let  represent the number of eligible individuals in the  household, selected from the  
enumeration area in the  stratum. Given that a single agricultural business is selected from 
the household members present, the probability of selecting an agricultural business ( ) is: 
             (20) 
The total inclusion probability  for an individual agricultural business accounts for the 
probability inclusion at each stage of the sample selection process and is equal to: 
          (21) 
The sampling weight of the survey  is the inverse of the probability of selection: 
          (22) 
Non-response could impact the probability of inclusion; hence ex post adjustments may need 
to be made to the initial weights. After the initial weights have been adopted, post 
stratification adjustments may also be employed to update the sample distribution in line with 
the target population distribution. These adjustments can address under-coverage of key 
population indicators and/or non-response. The selection of USUs ensures that the 
enumerator interviewed a random sample of qualifying agricultural businesses. Given the 
selection of eight households in stage two, it is expected that eight interviews would be 
conducted in each enumerator area; however, this was not always the case. If the selected 
household member was unavailable for the interview, they were replaced by a random 
selection from the qualifiers not previously selected, within the enumeration area. If the 
selected enumerator area yielded no interviews, it was replaced by a random selection from 
the remaining enumerator areas. 
The number of qualifying households in the  enumeration area in the  stratum may be 
represented by , while the number of agricultural businesses from this sample with 
completed questionnaires is . The initial weights are adjusted for non-response using the 
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inverse of the probability of securing a completed questionnaire from the updated sample of 
qualifying households selected in an enumeration area. Thus, the adjusted sampling weights 
 are: 
            (23) 
This study concerns itself with agricultural producers, particularly within the crop sub-sector. 
Ex-post weight adjustments would be required in order to reflect this non-random sampling. 
The total sample of agricultural businesses selected may be represented by , while the 
total number of crop producers may be represented by . The adjusted weights (8) are 
further adjusted using the inverse of the probability of being selected from the crop sub-
sector; these adjusted sampling weights  are: 
            (24) 
In summary, the first stage was expected to result in a sample of 626 enumeration areas being 
drawn, with 8 households being selected at the second stage, and 8 agricultural businesses 
being selected at the third stage. Thus, the sample design targeted a sample size of 5008 
agricultural businesses. The survey ultimately resulted in 639 enumeration areas being drawn, 
which were geographically representative at the national and urban-rural level, and 4094 
interviews being conducted. The most frequently interviewed agricultural businesses were 
those involved in production, 3,734, followed by service providers and processors, with 256 
and 104 respectively (YDC 2011, p.16). 
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4.3 Research approach and strategy 
Empirical literature addressing the impact of credit constraints on the consumption and 
production decisions of agricultural households has used survey data to estimate the 
likelihood of being credit constrained and its impact on various economic outcomes (Petrick 
2005, pp.196-198). Studies have typically estimated these impacts using two-step procedures; 
which are inefficient and may result in standard errors that are not consistent. A one-step 
procedure overcomes these challenges, and accounts for the potential simultaneity of 
consumption and production decisions in the context of a binding credit constraint. 
Two distinct steps describe the empirical strategy undertaken by this study. The first stage 
involves making use of qualitative information obtained from a representative household 
survey to ascertain the credit constraint status of agricultural businesses in Tanzania. The 
classification of credit constraint status, across borrowers and non-borrowers, may be 
delineated by whether constraints are induced from the supply-side or the demand-side 
(Boucher et al 2009 pp.612-615; Guirkinger and Boucher 2008, p.297). This study follows a 
structured procedure to identify the credit constraint status of agricultural households and is 
aptly described in the literature as the Direct Elicitation Method (DEM). 
Sample selection bias (or selectivity bias) may arise when a sample is not randomly chosen 
from a target population, such that the sample is not representative of the whole population. 
In order to analyze the productivity of crop producers in Tanzania, a large part of the 
agricultural business population is omitted from the initial sample, since livestock producers, 
processors, and service providers are not included in the sample. Heckman (1979, p.153) 
postulated that sample selection bias may result either from self-selection by sampling units 
or selection decisions during data processing or data analysis. Hence, the reasons why 
agricultural business owners are involved in crop production, amongst other activities, are not 
random.  
An inverse probability weight is applied to address the non-random sampling of agricultural 
households involved in crop production from the total sample of agricultural businesses 
representative of the whole population in Tanzania. 
The Heckman selection model is applied only when one regime is observed and conclusions 
are inferred from observations of that regime, whereas switching regression models are 
applied when both regimes are observed (Dutoit 2007, pp.28-30).  
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Hence, the primary difference arises from the dependent variable being observed in either 
only one or two regimes, respectively. However, in the Heckman framework, the unobserved 
regime needs to be taken into account in the estimation strategy. While the Heckman 
framework is only appropriate when the switch is endogenous, the switching regression may 
be applied if the switch is either endogenous or exogenous.  
In this study, the sample separation is known and has been ascertained using the direct 
elicitation method that indicates the constraint status (or regime) that each crop producer 
belongs to. Output value per hectare is observed for both constrained and unconstrained 
agricultural businesses, while the sample under investigation is representative of all crop 
producers. Hence, regressing the output value per hectare on crop producers’ firm and 
household characteristics would lead to estimates for the sample of all crop producers and 
therefore allow conclusions to be inferred for the whole population. 
The switching model is endogenous as credit constraint status presumably depends on the 
output value per hectare in the two regimes. It is expected that crop producers’ extent of 
access to credit, and consequently their opportunity for participation in credit, may be 
enhanced by their improved productivity. Conversely, it is assumed that crop producers are 
rational and will seek to relax credit constraints under the premise that productivity is better 
for unconstrained agricultural businesses. 
Accordingly, the second stage of this study makes use of the output from the first stage and 
an endogenous switching regression model is adopted in order to investigate the impact of 
credit constraint status on agricultural productivity in Tanzania. 
The switching regression model will enable the simultaneous estimation of the likelihood of 
being credit constrained and the consequential impact on gross farm income; taking into 
account both endogeneity and sample selection (Lokshin and Sajaia 2004, p.282).  
Differences in agricultural production value between constrained and unconstrained 
households may provide motivation for programmes that enhance the provision of finance. 
However, evidence that suggests constrained households misallocate capital away from 
productive activities may undermine any efforts to increase the supply of funding in credit 
markets. 
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First Stage 
The first stage of the study makes use of the DEM and will draw on the borrowing module 
within the financial behaviour section of the AgFims survey for relevant information about 
the characteristics of borrowing behaviour and perceptions about credit constraint status. 
Firstly, we would like to separate households by whether they applied to borrow funds or not. 
The survey asks a question about each agricultural household’s attempts to borrow from 
particular sources of funds. Various formal and informal sources of funding are presented as 
options. 
From which of the following have you attempted to borrow money from in the past 12 months? 16 
Thereafter, loan applicants are classified as either borrowers or non-borrowers based on 
whether they obtained a loan in the past or not. If they did obtain a loan, the survey goes one 
step further in eliciting information about the particular source(s) of funds. 
Have you borrowed money in the past 12 months for business purposes? 17 
If Yes, where did you borrow from? 18 
Supply-side constraints arise when the suppliers of credit do not provide a sufficient supply to 
meet demand; thus, this excess demand is a consequence of quantity rationing. Using the 
Direct Elicitation Method, Boucher et al (2009, p.618) identified three distinct groups of 
supply-constrained households, namely: unsatisfied borrowers, rejected applicants, and 
“certainly rejected” non-applicants. 
Unsatisfied borrowers are able to borrow, albeit the supply of funds available does not meet 
their demand. This group may be identified either by eliciting qualitative information about a 
borrower’s desire for more funds at the prevailing interest rate or by collecting quantitative 
information pertaining to the amount of credit requested and the credit limit granted. In the 
absence of such information, we are unable to delineate borrowers by whether they are 
satisfied or not. 
Rejected applicants are unable to borrow, despite having a positive demand for credit. These 
households may be identified presuming that they made an unsuccessful attempt to borrow. 
                                                          
16 Survey Question M2. Responses [Yes/No]: Bank, MFI, Sacco, VICOBA, VSLA, ROSCA, Savings group, Money Lender, 
Customers, Friends and Family, SIDO, FINCA, Farmers Association, PRIDE, DASPU, Cooperative, Pastoralists, SPG, 
Tribal association. 
17 Survey Question M3.a. Responses: Yes/No 
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An unsuccessful attempt is necessary, but not sufficient, to strictly classify a household as a 
rejected applicant. “Certainly rejected” non-applicants did not attempt to borrow as they 
anticipated their applications would be rejected based on previous experiences or their 
perceptions about the suppliers of funding. The former classification is a factual observation 
resulting from a “positive” outcome, whereas the latter classification is a hypothetical 
construct derived from a normative expectation of credit suppliers’ behaviour. 
The information provided by the survey in question does not explicitly address whether 
applicants were successful in their application for borrowed funds or not. However, by 
comparing the attempts to borrow from particular sources of funds with the actual borrowing 
undertaken by each respective household we may make some inferences about access to 
credit and credit constraint status. 
An attempt to borrow funds from a particular source is interpreted as a loan application. A 
borrower is entitled to submit more than one application for funds; as such numerous 
attempts may have been made to borrow from the same source or various sources. Further, 
the survey does not provide any insights into the sequencing and timing differences of 
borrowing attempts, particularly for those agricultural households that submitted more than 
one loan application over the previous twelve months. 
The observed borrowing event may be unambiguously interpreted as participation in credit 
from a particular source; conversely, a household that attempted to borrow from a particular 
source of funds, yet does not actually borrow, is interpreted as having been rejected from that 
particular source. In much the same way that loan applicants are not confined to a single 
source of funds, participation in multiple sources of funds is permitted. 
In the context of a single source of funding, rejected applicants may be unequivocally 
classified as supply-side constrained. The survey in question provides scope for households 
to attempt to borrow from numerous sources of credit. Thus, a household is classified as 
rejected if, and only if, it does not participate in any sources of credit, despite attempting to 
borrow from them. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
18 Survey Question M3.b. Responses [Yes/No]: Bank, MFI, Sacco, VICOBA, VSLA, ROSCA, Savings group, Money 
Lender, Customers, Friends and Family, SIDO, FINCA, Farmers Association, PRIDE, Auctioneers, Presidential trust fund, 
Shareholders group. 
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An unsuccessful attempt to borrow from one source may be followed up with a successful 
application to borrow from a different source of funds. Hence, the aggregate supply of funds 
available to a household may be sufficient to meet its demand even if not all loan applications 
are successful.  
Households that participated in at least one source of funding are treated as borrowers, 
however at least one unsuccessful attempt at borrowing from any source is sufficient to 
classify these borrowers as quantity rationed. We premise this assumption of the basis that 
more credit is preferred to less; and a household that is able to obtain funding, from all the 
sources that it applied to, is better off than a household that did not. Despite having been 
rejected, these borrowers have been able to secure credit out of the numerous attempts and 
are hence considered to be unsatisfied borrowers. 
Rejected applicants and “certainly rejected” non-applicants are classified as non-borrowers. 
Based on the reasonable assumption that loan participation is preceded by a loan application, 
households that did not attempt to borrow may be viewed as a subset of non-borrowing 
households. Further information is required to identify households’ reasons for not 
borrowing; the survey asks a question to elicit this information. 
Why have you not borrowed money for the business? 19 
The responses to this question (see Table 5) provide key insights into each non-borrowing 
household’s credit market experiences and perceptions. Response A, “Tried but was 
unsuccessful”, provides the only indicator of households that were unambiguously rejected 
from any sources of credit. Responses B - E highlight responses that would be expected from 
households that were “certainly rejected” based on previous experiences and/or their 
perception of credit suppliers’ behaviour and lending rules. The most common response 
amongst the supply-constrained households addresses the perception that “there is 
nobody/institution that will lend the business money”, while the least common response 
being that they “don’t meet the requirements.” 
Unconstrained households are loan applicants and non-applicants whose demand for credit is 
fully met. As was the case in identifying unsatisfied borrowers, satisfied borrowers may only 
strictly be identified either by eliciting a lack of desire for more funds or using detailed 
information that allows us to compare the amount of credit requested against the credit 
granted. The information at hand presents limitations to such a detailed exposition. 
                                                          
19 Survey Question M9. See Table 5 for responses. 
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Nevertheless, we are able to infer satisfaction by observing that all the sources of funds that a 
household attempted to borrow from correspond with the all sources of actual borrowing.  A 
successful loan application is assumed to be synonymous with a satisfied borrower; 
consequently, the number of households that are supply-side constrained may be understated. 
Table 5. Reasons enumerated for non-borrowing 
Quantity constrained (constrained) 
A. Tried, but was unsuccessful 
B. There is nobody/institution that will lend the business money 
C. Poor credit record 
D. Did not have collateral/security 
E. Don’t meet the requirements 
Price rationed (unconstrained) 
F. Business did not need to borrow 
G. Interest rate is too high 
Transaction-costs rationed (constrained) 
H. Don’t know where to borrow from, how to go about it 
I. I have not done preparation to get a loan 
J. Takes too long to get the money 
Risk rationed (constrained) 
K. Business has too much debt already 
L. I do not like to borrow money, fear of defaulting 
M. Repayment terms are too tight 
N. Religious reasons, no interest. 
Source: Synovate Tanzania (2011a, p.45) 
Table 5. Reasons enumerated for non-borrowing 
Non-applicant households were further classified as unconstrained if they reported that the 
business did not need to borrow or that interest rates were too high. These price-rationed 
households are not inhibited by asymmetric information in their access to credit, however 
they are able to voluntarily withdraw from participation in credit until such a time when 
conditions are favourable. 
Demand-side constraints arise when households, with potentially profitable investment 
opportunities, voluntarily limit their participation in credit. Both borrowers and non-
borrowers are subject to these constraints. Although credit rationing has been described as an 
equilibrium phenomenon in credit markets, there may be individual households that are 
presented with adequate access to credit. The nature of the demand-side constraints may be 
ascertained by investigating the motivations for households’ non-borrowing, as highlighted in 
Table 5 above. 
An excess supply of funds may arise as a result of frictions in credit markets. Transaction 
costs rationing and risk rationing are limitations on borrowing, imposed by both loan 
applicants and non-applicants, resulting from an avoidance of high transaction costs and an 
aversion to the uncertainty associated with higher return activities, respectively. Responses H 
- J provide indications of households that limited their borrowing activity as a result of 
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transaction and search costs associated with borrowing. Households falling under this 
classification commonly stated that they don’t know where to borrow from or how to go 
about it; this was the most common response among the sample of non-borrowers. Responses 
K - L provide insight into risk rationed households, with the most common response being 
that the household does not like to borrow money, which is aggravated by the fear of not 
being able to settle the obligations as they fall due. 
Table 6. Credit constraints and short term borrowing in the sample of crop producers 
  
Borrowers 
(short term) 
Non-borrowers Total 
Unconstrained 
535 805 1340 
(15.86)  (23.86)  (39.72)  
Constrained 
1940 94 2034 
(57.50)  (2.79)  (60.28)  
Price constrained 
614 0 614 
(18.20)  (0.00)  (18.20)  
Quantity constrained 
1132 94 1226 
(33.55)  (2.79)  (36.34)  
Transaction cost constrained 
623 0 623 
(18.46)  (0.00)  (18.46)  
Risk constrained 
292 0 292 
(8.65)  (0.00)  (8.65)  
Total 
2475 899 3374 
(73.36)  (26.64)  (100)  
Note: Each cell provides the absolute number of agricultural businesses; proportion of total sample in brackets 
Table 6. Summary of credit constraints and short term borrowing in the sample of crop producers 
In summary, we classified agricultural businesses as constrained, in the formal or semi-formal 
sector, or unconstrained; in addition to classifying them as borrowers or non-borrowers. 
Approximately 73.36% of the agricultural producers in the study are reported to have 
borrowed money for business purposes in the past 12 months. Among those who participated 
in short-term borrowing, 78.38% were classified as credit constrained in the formal or semi-
formal sectors, whereas amongst non-borrowers only 10.46% were classified as being 
constrained in credit. In this case, quantity constrained agricultural businesses represent the 
full subsample of non-borrowers, whereas they represent 45.74% of all borrowing 
agricultural producers. Transaction costs rationed represents a substantial portion of 
borrowers in the sample, at 25.17%, followed by agricultural businesses that are price 
rationed or unconstrained. Risk rationed agricultural businesses represent the smallest 
percentage of constrained borrowers. In the total sample of borrowers and non-borrower, we 
classified approximately 60.28% as constrained in the formal or semi-formal sector. 
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Second Stage 
The second stage of this study investigates the likelihood of being credit constrained and its 
impact on economic output. To ensure that our investigation is theoretically consistent, the 
classification of credit constraint status may be defined within the context of the agricultural 
household model developed earlier. We rearrange the budget constraint (3) as follows: 
       (25) 
Let the demand of and supply for credit be defined as follows: 
           (26) 
       (27) 
We define a variable  as the difference between the demand for and supply of credit; i.e. a 
representation of the excess demand for credit: 
            (28) 
The interaction of credit supply and demand is not directly observable; as such we assume 
that excess credit demand is denoted by a latent variable. Hence, the selection equation of 
credit constraint status is represented as follows: 
            (29) 
          (30) 
The vector  represents explanatory variables, such as household and production 
characteristics, which affect the probability of an agricultural business being credit 
constrained, γ is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and  is a random error term. 
Suppose we observe a binary indicator variable that equals one if an agricultural business is 
supply-side credit constrained and zero otherwise. Frictions arising from transaction costs or 
risks may result in the agricultural business voluntarily participating in less credit than it has 
access to. Thus, demand-side constraints would be represented by an indicator variable that 
may equal one despite an excess supply of credit. 
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4.4 Econometric model 
Endogenous Switching Regression model 
Following Feder et al (1990), Foltz (2004), Winter-Nelson and Temu (2004) and Ali et al 
(2014) we estimate an endogenous switching regression model of agricultural productivity, 
which describes the outcomes of agricultural businesses that are sorted into two groups based 
on their credit constraint status. The outcome equations are represented as: 
        (31) 
Here, the dependent variables  are the observed outcomes for agricultural businesses that 
are constrained ( ) and unconstrained ( ), respectively.  and  represent 
explanatory variables that would influence both  and ; as such there is overlap between 
 and . and  are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and  and  and random 
error terms. 
The error terms ,  and  are assumed to be jointly normally distributed, with zero 
mean and covariance matrix: 
        (32) 
 is the variance of the error term in the selection equation; it is assumed to be equal to 1 as 
γ is only estimable up to a scale factor (Maddala 1983, 223; p.1986, p.1635).   and are 
the variances of the error terms in the outcome equations.  is the covariance of  and , 
while  is the covariance of  and .  The covariance , between  and , cannot 
be defined as  and  can never be observed simultaneously (Maddala 1983, p.224).  
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Unobserved characteristics that simultaneously affect the probability of being credit 
constrained and the economic outcome may result in the error term of the selection equation 
being correlated to the error terms of the outcome equations. Hence, the expected values of 
 and , conditional on the sample selection, are nonzero: 
      (33) 
     (34) 
 is the standard normal probability density function and  is the standard normal 
cumulative density function. If the estimated covariances  and  are statistically 
significant, then credit constraint status and the output value per hectare are correlated. This 
provides evidence of endogenous switching and serves as motivation for the appropriateness 
of the estimation strategy. 
The Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method is an efficient approach for 
estimating endogenous switching regression models.20 The FIML simultaneously estimates 
the selection and outcome equations in order to obtain consistent standard errors; while the 
simultaneous maximum likelihood estimation corrects for selectivity bias across constraint-
status output estimates (Lokshin and Sajaia 2004, pp.282-284; Di Falco et al 2011 pp.835-
840; Asfaw et al 2012, p.286). Given the assumptions about the distribution of the error 
terms, the logarithmic likelihood function for the system of equations (29) and (31) is: 
      (35) 
Where, 
         (36) 
 represents the correlation coefficient between the selection equation error and outcome 
equations respective errors .
                                                          
20 The “movestay” command of STATA was used to estimate the endogenous switching regression model (Lokshin and 
Sajaia 2004, p.284) 
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Conditional expectations, treatment and heterogeneity effects 
Following Di Falco et al (2011, pp.836-837) and Asfaw et al (2012, pp. 287-288), the 
endogenous switching regression model can be used to compare the expected value of output 
per hectare of the agricultural businesses that are credit constrained (a) with respect to the 
agricultural businesses that are not constrained (b). Further, the model may be used to 
investigate expected economic outcomes in the counterfactual hypothetical cases that 
constrained households were not constrained (c), and unconstrained households were 
constrained (d). The conditional expectations can be evaluated as follows: 
                  (37a) 
                   (37b)
 
                  (37c)
 
                  (37d)
 
In order to investigate the impact of credit constraints on agricultural productivity we 
calculate the relevant treatment effects. Table 7 summarizes the conditional expectations, 
treatment and heterogeneity effects. 
Table 7. Conditional expectations, treatment, and heterogeneity effects 
Sub-samples  
(constraint status) 
Observed outcome 
Treatment effects 
Unconstrained ( y0i) Constrained ( y1i) 
Unconstrained (ki=0) (a) E( y0i|ki=0) (c) E( y1i|ki=0) TT 
Constrained (ki=1) (d) E( y0i|ki=1) (b) E( y1i|ki=1) TU 
Heterogeneity effects BH0 BH1 TH 
Source: Adapted from Di Falco et al (2011, p.837), Asfaw et al (2012, p.287) 
Notes:  
(a) and (b) represent observed expected crop output value per hectare;  
(c) and (d) represent counterfactual expected crop output value per hectare. 
ki = 0 if agricultural business is unconstrained;  
ki = 1 if agricultural business is credit constrained;  
y0i : crop output value if agricultural business is unconstrained; 
y1i : crop output value if agricultural business is unconstrained; 
TT: the effect of the treatment (i.e., credit constraint relaxation) on the treated (i.e., agricultural 
businesses that were unconstrained); 
TU: the effect of the treatment (i.e., credit constraint relaxation) on the untreated (i.e., agricultural 
businesses that were constrained);  
BHi : the effect of base heterogeneity for agricultural businesses that were unconstrained (i = 0), and 
constrained (i = 1);  
TH = (TT - TU), i.e., transitional heterogeneity. 
Table 7. Conditional expectations, treatment, and heterogeneity effects 
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We begin by evaluating the effect of the treatment on the treated ( ) to determine the 
impact of credit constraint relaxation (i.e. the treatment in this instance) on the agricultural 
productivity of agricultural businesses that are unconstrained. Intuitively, this represents the 
difference between the actual expectations observed in the sample of agricultural businesses 
that were unconstrained (a) and the counterfactual expected outcomes of relaxing the credit 
constraints of constrained businesses (c): 
        (38) 
We evaluate the effect of the treatment on the untreated ( ) to determine the impact of the 
credit constraints on the agricultural productivity of agricultural businesses that are 
constrained. This represents the difference in outcome between the counterfactual case where 
unconstrained agricultural businesses experience credit constraints (d) and the actual 
expectations observed for constrained businesses (b): 
 
 
       (39) 
The base heterogeneity effect  is calculated to determine the difference between the 
actual expected outcomes observed in the sample of agricultural businesses that were 
unconstrained (a) relative to the counterfactual case where credit constraints are imposed on 
unconstrained agricultural businesses (d): 
        (40)
 
Similarly, the base heterogeneity for constrained agricultural businesses  is the 
difference between (c) and (b): 
         (41) 
The transitional heterogeneity effect  is calculated to determine whether the impact of 
relaxing credit constraints is larger or smaller for agricultural businesses that were actually 
unconstrained or for constrained agricultural businesses in the counterfactual case that their 
constraints were relaxed; this is represented by the difference between  and : 
       (42)
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4.5 Specification of the estimating equations 
Selection and outcome dependent variables 
In the selection equation, the latent variable representing credit constraint status or excess 
credit demand is defined as a dummy variable that takes on the value one  when an 
agricultural business is constrained in the formal21 or semi-formal22 credit sector and zero 
otherwise . In the outcome equation, the measure of productivity adopted by this 
study is the crop output value per hectare (Feder et al 1990, p.1155; Guirkinger and Boucher 
2008, p.302); which reflects the approximate income of the agricultural business per hectare 
of land used for the purpose of production. We define the outcome variable using land used 
by the agricultural business as it is reflective of the production potential of the business. The 
definitions of the variables used in this study are reported in Appendix Table 11. 
Farm characteristics 
Land owned is used as a measure of fixed capital and an indicator of collateralizable wealth.  
In Tanzania, the Land (Amendment) Act , 2004 permits owned and registered land to be 
mortgaged and used as collateral (URT 2004, p.6-11), as such an increase in the land 
endowment is expected to have a direct, positive impact on the supply of credit (Foltz 2004, 
pp.232; Petrick 2004, p.89). Further, we include a dummy variable that takes on the value one 
when the business owner has a title deed and zero otherwise.  
Guirkinger and Boucher (2008, pp.299-303) explore the possibility of reverse causality 
relationship between holding title and productivity; such that in anticipation of a greater 
credit need, “farmers with a greater intrinsic productivity” would have a higher likelihood of 
obtaining title for their land holdings. Ceteris paribus, we expect to observe a negative 
relationship between the land endowment of an agricultural business and crop output value 
per hectare, as the variable inputs available to the business may be constrained and thus 
inefficiently utilized over larger areas of land. Hence, the agricultural businesses in the 
sample are expected to experience diminishing returns to scale. 
                                                          
21 Formal Financial Institutions include: commercial banks 
22 Semi-Formal Financial Institutions include: microfinance institutions, savings and credit cooperative societies, 
cooperatives, non-governmental organisations (i.e. FINCA, SIDO, PRIDE), and government-mandated institutions 
(Presidential Trust Fund, and the DASPU project). 
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Ownership of a storage facility or warehouse represents fixed capital, and further reinforces 
the collateral position of the agricultural business. The quality of fixed capital and 
collateralizable wealth is captured by whether an agricultural business owner has an irrigation 
system or not; which is expected to enhance  the productivity potential of the business. 
Involvement in a cooperative or farmer’s association provides an avenue to gain access to 
social networks and information and was measured using a dummy variable that took on the 
value one if the agricultural business owner received advice from the relevant association and 
zero otherwise (Ali et al 2014, p.659). Given that the distribution of loans from semi-formal 
institutions is oftentimes channeled through local institutions, potential borrowers association 
membership may enhance their reputational capital, as activity in associations may signal to 
potential lenders that an agricultural business is well known locally. 
Hence, associational activity is expected to improve communication and enhance the flow of 
information to farmers; reducing transaction costs, particularly related to the loan application 
process and the understanding of contractual terms. Thus, we expect association membership 
to reduce the likelihood of an agricultural business being credit constrained. Further, the flow 
of information and communication is expected to relate to agricultural practice that may 
positively impact the productivity of the farm. 
We include the number of full time and part time family members who work for the business, 
in addition to the agricultural business owner, to serve as a measure of a household’s 
endowment of family labour (Winter-Nelson 2005, p.878). Guirkinger and Boucher (2009, 
p.303) highlight the importance of family labour and the positive impact it is expected to 
have on credit constrained farm households, further positing that the substitutability of hired 
and family labour will determine the extent to which the family labour endowment affects the 
productivity of unconstrained farm households. 
Farmer and farm household characteristics 
The savings commanded by an agricultural business represents the initial liquidity 
endowment. Savings in financial institutions are captured using a dummy variable that takes 
on the value 1 if the agricultural business has savings in formal financial institutions (i.e. 
registered bank or shares). It is expected that the availability of savings would contribute to 
the relaxation of credit constraints experienced by the business, while enhancing crop output 
value per hectare if funds are directed towards productive activities.
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Petrick (2004, p.88) raised issues with the operationalization of total liquidity as a stock 
variable, at a point in time. In particular, the relative ease of transformation into cash, for 
various asset classes, would require assumptions that may be difficult to evaluate; and cash 
stocks may exhibit variability across  production structures and seasons, making if difficult to 
compare across agricultural businesses or households. As such, the availability of savings 
serves as an indicator of liquidity as it addresses the concerns of convertibility and 
comparability. 
The number of dependents serves as an indicator of household size, in conjunction with the 
endowment of family labour (Feder et al 1990, p.1154).  The consumption needs of the 
household, and the associated liquidity needs, are expected to increase with the addition of 
each non-productive household member (Petrick 2004, p.90). Hence, each additional 
dependent is expected to increase the likelihood of an agricultural business being credit 
constrained. Further, the number of dependents is expected to be inversely related to labour 
capacity, which may adversely impact farm productivity. 
The age of the farmer and the number of years of involvement in farming-related activities 
may serve to indicate labour capacity and experience. Age is represented by continuous data. 
Due to the absence of continuous data for years of experience it was measured using a 
dummy variable that takes on the value one when the agricultural business owner has been 
involved in agriculture for more than five years and zero otherwise.  It is expected that more 
years of experience would enhance the labour capacity available to the business and hence its 
productivity, while an increase in the age of the farmer is expected to marginally diminish 
labour capacity. Further, the former is expected to lower the likelihood of being credit 
constrained and the latter is expected to have an adverse impact on credit constraint status. 
The education level of the business owner is captured by dummy variables that take on the 
value one to indicate either: i. no education; ii, incomplete primary education; iii; completed 
primary education; iv, completed secondary education, or otherwise. It is expected that higher 
levels of education will have a larger, positive impact on gross farm income resulting from 
the intrinsic capabilities and skills of the producer; while reducing the likelihood that the 
farm household is credit constrained (Winter-Nelson 2005, p.876). 
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We include a dummy variable that takes on the value one when the agricultural business 
owner is male and zero otherwise. Fletschener (2008, pp.626-628) uses a sample of 210 
couples in rural Paraguay to identify the respective credit constraint status of each spouse. It 
was found that women are more likely to be credit constrained, and their constraint status 
may be impacted by different factors to those that influence men’s constraint status. 
Furthermore, husbands that were able to intermediate credit to their spouses were shown to 
choose otherwise. Hence, it is expected that female owned agricultural businesses will exhibit 
a higher likelihood of being credit constrained. Following from this, we would anticipate that 
male owned agricultural businesses with increased access to credit would have enhanced 
productivity potential than female owned businesses. 
In the absence of input and output price data, we assume that price variability amongst 
observations in the Agricultural Financial Marketing Scoping Survey is low and somewhat 
negligible. Any variation in prices is assumed to be based on geographic differences and crop 
choice. Hence, we include eight dummy variables for the zones23 in which each respective 
agricultural business operates (Feder et al 1990, p.1154); and four dummy variables that take 
on the value one if the agricultural business is involved in the production of any of the 
following crops: maize, cassava, cotton or cashew, and zero otherwise. The aforementioned 
crops were included due their influence on the performance of food and cash crops in 
Tanzania. 
For identification purposes, it is important to introduce exclusion restrictions and include 
variables that influence the selection variable without having an impact on the outcome 
variable. In addition to the explanatory variables from the outcome equation, the selection 
equation includes a set of instrumental variables that will affect the agricultural business’s 
credit constraint status, but not the crop output value per hectare. In particular, we use 
indicators of information and net government transfers that would indirectly support 
production and consumption activity by directly contributing to the relaxation of the credit 
constraints experienced by an agricultural household. The measure of information is an 
extension services dummy variable that takes on the value one if the agricultural business 
owner received advice from the government and zero otherwise; the measure of government 
transfers is a dummy variable taking the value one if the agricultural business made use of 
any inputs or services that were subsidized or provided by the government. 
                                                          
23 Northern, Western, Central, Southern Highlands, Lake, Eastern, Southern, and Zanzibar zones. 
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4.6 Research reliability and validity 
Reliability describes the consistency and reproducibility of the output produced by a 
measurement instrument under varying circumstances, ceteris paribus; while validity relates 
to the strength and accuracy of our inferences, i.e. alignment between what we intend to 
measure and what we actually measure (Roberts P et al 2006, p.1; Adams et al 2007, pp.235-
240). Internal validity investigates the causality relationship between our treatment and 
outcome, whereas external validity relates to the generalizability of our results. Reliability is 
necessary, but not sufficient for validity. By testing alternative specifications we are able to 
stress test the generalizability and sensitivity of our output. 
Following Di Falco (2011) and Asfaw et al (2012), the acceptability of the proposed 
instruments is evaluated by conducting a rejection test; which tests the suitability and validity 
of instruments by determining whether they will affect the credit constraint status, but not the 
crop output value per hectare among households that are unconstrained. The results presented 
in Appendix Table 12 suggest that the two proposed variables are indeed suitable and valid in 
their use as instrumental variables; together, they have a jointly statistically significant impact 
on credit constraint status (selection equation, χ2 = 19.86; p = 0.00), but not on the crop 
output value per hectare of agricultural businesses that are unconstrained (outcome equation, 
F -stat. = 0.33, p = 0.72). 
The design effect (deff) and root design effect (deft) are concepts that aide in assessing the 
effect of complex survey design on precision; by comparing the variance of an estimate under 
the complex design and the variance that we would have hypothetically obtained from simple 
random sampling without replacement (Deaton 1997, p.15).  The deft and deff ratios are as 
follows: 
          (43) 
         (44) 
where is the design-based standard error and  is an estimate of what the standard 
would be under simple random sampling; with the variances being captured by and , 
respectively. 
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Design effects were obtained using the outcome equation dependent variable, output value 
per hectare. The effect of the three stage stratified sample design, with disproportionate 
selection, adopted by the Agricultural Financial Market Scoping reflects a marginal decrease 
in the standard error to 42,425 , relative to  simple random sample 44,266. The deff indicates 
that the complex survey sample variance is approximately 1.09 times more than if the survey 
were based on a SRS, using the same sample size. The root design effects (DEFT) measure 
implies that the confidence intervals would have to be approximately 1.04 times as large as 
they would under SRS, as DEFT measures how much the sample errors increase by. These 
findings imply that the output value per hectare is relatively homogeneous within strata. In 
summary, the simple equivalent sample (SES) is approximately n = 3086, which is smaller 
than the actual sample size of 3,734 agricultural producers. 
To examine the reliability of our results we repeat our estimation under two alternative 
specifications. Following Ali et al (2014, p.659-661) the dependent variable in the 
endogenous switching regression framework is the natural logarithm of agricultural business 
output value per hectare; hence the outcome equation takes on a log-linear or log-level form. 
In the log-log specification, the agricultural business’s endowment of land and labour per 
hectare are defined in log form (Guirkinger and Boucher 2008, p.304; Winter-Nelson and 
Temu 2005, p.878). Examining and controlling for outliers may further evaluate reliability. 
Based on a visual inspection of histograms, box-plots, and scatterplots of the key continuous 
variables used in this study (see Appendix Figures 1 and 2), we find any outliers are managed 
effectively through the natural log transformation of our data. Hence, we do not eliminate any 
observations, as the thresholds would be arbitrary at best; and proceed with our study by 
estimating the aforementioned alternative specifications. In order to evaluate the robustness 
and construct validity of our output we estimate alternative specifications whereby we define 
and operationalize credit constrained agricultural businesses under quantity constraints and 
all constraints (i.e. quantity, transaction costs, and risk constraints), respectively. 
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4.7 Research limitations 
Due to the limited data availability on agricultural activities in Tanzania, this study faces 
potential measurement issues The operationalization of credit constraint status was directly 
elicited from the AgFims survey, however a more purposeful conceptualization of credit 
constraints may be obtained with a more intent measurement instrument.  
In a survey field report, Synovate Tanzania (2011, p.17) reported numerous challenges 
relating to the survey instrument used during data collection. Respondents were required to 
report income from the previous year related to the agribusiness, however total income from 
all sources was typically provided. As a resolution, enumerators were required to emphasize 
that only income from the targeted agricultural business for the previous year was pertinent. 
Despite the insistence of the interviewer, the challenge of obtaining an appropriate 
approximation of income may result in an overestimation of output value per hectare; which 
may further be exacerbated by recall bias experienced by respondents. Further, the AgFims 
survey did not capture information on output quantities, input and output prices. As such we 
are unable to explicitly account for differences in pricing across regions or type of crop. 
The cross-sectional nature of the survey instrument adopted by this study precludes the 
evaluation of the reliability of the findings over time; and limitations to the generalizability of 
the results may arise due to the census sampling frame being outdated. The historical 
enumeration areas do not account for changes over time, which may result in sampling errors 
and unrepresentative samples being selected.  
The non-random sampling approach of the survey, and the subsequent sampling of 
agricultural producers performed by this study, may result in findings that are biased and not 
representative or generalizable to the Tanzanian agricultural sector. Sampling error may arise 
as a sample is used instead of the whole population. The survey may be subject to selection 
bias, due to the sample frame not adequately capturing some part of the target population. In 
estimating output value per hectare we must be cognizant that the unobserved factors 
influencing credit constraint status may be systematically related to the expected effects of 
credit on various economic outcomes. Ex-post weight adjustments are introduced to the 
design weights to account for the disproportionate probability of selection of households 
involved in agricultural production. Further, the simultaneous maximum likelihood 
estimation mitigates selection bias in constraint status output estimates. 
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4.8 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter provided a comprehensive review of the empirical methodology to be 
undertaken by this study. We discussed the secondary data obtained for this study from the 
Agricultural Financial Market Scoping survey and described its complex three-stage survey 
design. The research approach taken by this study may be summarized in two steps. Firstly, 
we make use of qualitative information in order to determine the credit constraint status of 
agricultural businesses in Tanzania; and secondly, we use the credit constraint status to 
investigate its impact on agricultural businesses’ crop output value per hectare.  
We use secondary data captured by the Agricultural Financial Market Scoping survey 
between April and September 2011, due to its representativeness of the agricultural landscape 
in Tanzania. The particular focus of this study is on subsample of crop producers, which 
account for the largest contribution to economic output and enables the mitigation of any sub-
sector variation that may result from self-selection. 
The survey employs a three stage stratified sample design to assure that the sample is 
representative of the target population. The sampling design takes into account inclusion 
probabilities at the first stage where enumerator areas are selected within strata using 
systematic sampling, subsequently households are selected using systematic sampling based 
on inclusion criteria and, finally, qualifying agribusinesses are included based on random 
selections from eligible households. 
A structured exposition was undertaken in order to operationalize and directly elicit the credit 
constraint status of each agribusinesses, based on the information relating to their financial 
behaviour provided in the survey. We classified agribusinesses as constrained, in the formal 
or semi-formal sector, or unconstrained.  
We adopt the endogenous switching regression model in order to enhance the efficiency of 
our estimates, ensure consistency of our standard errors, and mitigate against sample 
selection bias that may ordinarily arise from implementing two-step procedures. We make use 
of the Full Information Maximum Likelihood method in order to simultaneously estimate the 
selection and outcome equations. The output from the endogenous switching regression will 
be used to calculate relevant treatment effects and investigate the relationship between credit 
constraint status and crop output value per hectare. 
 
 
 75 
 
The dependent variable in the selection equation is the credit constraint status of the 
agribusiness, while the dependent variable in the outcome equation is crop output value per 
hectare. The explanatory variables capture the characteristics of the farm, the farmer, and the 
agricultural household that would provide insights into how credit constraint status relates to 
agricultural productivity.  
The farm characteristics are represented by measures of fixed capital and collateral (land, 
buildings, storage), access to social networks and information (association), and inputs 
(employees per hectare). The particular farmer and farm household characteristics outline the 
availability of liquidity (savings in formal financial institutions), dependents on the income 
from the business, owner’s age, education, experience, and gender. We also include regional 
and crop choice dummy variables in order to account for any variation in input and output 
prices that are not explicitly captured by the specification of the model. 
The research strategy provides an opportunity to evaluate the reliability and validity of the 
estimation parameters. An evaluation of the design effects obtained, using the outcome 
equation dependent variable, provides evidence that the sample size is adequate relative to a 
hypothetical sample of agribusinesses selected randomly from the total population rather than 
a complex survey design. 
The econometric model will be estimated with a log-linear form and log-log form, 
respectively. In particular, the labour and land endowments will be redefined as their natural 
logarithm equivalents in order to investigate the consistency of the estimation output. The 
validity of the study will be evaluated by estimating the model under two alternative 
definitions of credit constraint status, which capture quantity constraints only, and all 
constraints, respectively. 
We acknowledge relevant research limitations, placing particular emphasis on measurement, 
identification, and generalizability issues. Potential issues related to the reliability of the 
direct elicitation method and enumeration challenges with regards to gross income are 
acknowledged. Further, sampling error may arise as a result of the sub-sampling of the crop 
producers captured by the survey. 
 
 
 76 
 
Chapter 5. Research findings and analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
This following chapter reports the significant research findings of the empirical investigation 
of credit rationing in Tanzania; and is presented in two main sections. The first section 
presents the descriptive statistics, and in particular, the section describes the sources and uses 
of borrowed funds for use in the business over the past 12 months, the income distribution of 
crop producers in the sample by credit constraint status, and lastly the means and standard 
errors of relevant variables used in the study. 
The second section presents the econometric results. The section initially presents the 
determinants of credit constraints experienced by agricultural businesses in the sample, 
followed by a presentation of the avenues and extent to which credit constraint status may 
impact agricultural productivity; concluding with a discussion on the relevant treatment 
effects experienced by constrained and unconstrained agricultural businesses in the sample. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
The distribution of loan purposes by type of lender is presented in Table 8. Based on the 
responses captured by the Agricultural Financial Market Scoping survey, informal financial 
institutions provided 69% of the total number of loans to crop producers in the sample. The 
primary suppliers of funds were family and friends, which represented 38.7% of loans, 
followed by loans from customers and moneylenders. The savings and credit groups (i.e. 
VICOBAs, VSLAs, ROSCAs, and savings groups) accounted for 15% of the total number of 
loans distributed. Semi-formal financial institutions represented 21.4% of all loans, with 
SACCOS accounting for the largest share, followed by microfinance institutions. The formal 
sector accounted for 9.6% of the total number of loans. 
Across all sources of funds, the primary motivations for borrowing money were the 
expansion of the business and the settlement of operational expenses, 51.8% and 35.6% of 
the total number of loans in the sample, respectively. In addition, 10.7% of the loans were 
obtained for risk management purposes. None of the loans reported for personal use were 
sourced from semi-formal institutions, while formal and informal institutions provided 1.8% 
and 0.4% of personal loans, respectively.
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Table 8. Distribution of loan purposes (uses) by type of lender (sources) 
Source of loans 
Total 
number 
 of 
loans 
% of 
total 
loans 
 
Purpose of loan (% distribution across loan type) 
  Expansion 
Operational 
expenses 
Risk  
management 
Personal  
use 
Other 
Formal 
        
Bank 110 9.6 
 
59.1 25.5 12.7 1.8 0.9 
         
Semi-formal 
        
MFI 84 7.3 
 
66.7 25.0 7.1 - 1.2 
SACCOS 153 13.4 
 
46.4 39.2 11.1 - 3.3 
FINCA 2 0.2 
 
100 - - - - 
PRIDE 2 0.2 
 
100   -   - - - 
Presidential trust fund 1 0.1 
 
- 100 - - - 
SIDO 3 0.3   66.7 - - - 33.3 
Subtotal 245 21.4 
 
54.3 33.5 9.4 - 2.9 
         
Informal 
        
VICOBA 44 3.8 
 
54.5 29.5 11.4 2.3 2.3 
VSLA 57 5.0 
 
54.4 31.6 12.3 - 1.8 
ROSCA 23 2.0 
 
39.1 43.5 4.3 4.3 8.7 
Savings group 48 4.2 
 
54.2 31.3 12.5 - 2.1 
Money-lenders 76 6.6 
 
48.7 36.8 14.5 - - 
Customers 87 7.6 
 
52.9 37.9 9.2 - - 
Friends and Family 444 38.7 
 
48.4 40.1 10.6 0.2 0.7 
Auctioneers 1 0.1 
 
100 - - - - 
Farmers association 8 0.7 
 
62.5 25.0 12.5 - - 
Shareholders group 3 0.3   66.7 33.3 - - - 
Subtotal 791 69.0 
 
50.1 37.7 10.9 0.4 1.0 
         
Total 1146 100   51.8 35.6 10.7 0.4 1.4 
 Table 8. Distribution of loan purposes (uses) by type of lender (sources) 
 
Table 9. Mean crop output value/ha distribution by credit constraint status 
  Mean Quintile   
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th n 
Full sample 735,472 91,405 225,547 405,522 757,061 2,764,784 3316 
Non-borrower 691,066 90,373 225,848 406,032 757,622 2,913,141 2429 
Borrower 865,121 96,024 224,392 404,012 755,796 2,498,232 887 
Constrained 667,930 89,128 224,491 406,077 753,969 2,689,602 1994 
Unconstrained 840,360 96,083 227,598 404,659 760,576 2,855,734 1322 
Price rationed 843,445 94,381 228,262 409,182 781,956 3,261,424 605 
Quantity constrained 677,495 89,213 224,408 405,148 752,967 2,586,899 1204 
Transaction cost constrained 640,415 86,735 222,088 413,999 762,973 2,931,631 609 
Risk constrained 663,618 91,915 227,864 393,830 722,592 2,661,622 286 
Note: The September 2011 period ending exchange rate was reported at Tsh 1640 per US dollar (IMF IFS 2015). 
Table 9. Mean crop output value per hectare distribution by credit constraint status 
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The distribution of crop output value per hectare is reported by credit constraint status in 
Table 9. The full sample of crop producers earns an average income of approximately TZS 
735,472 per hectare. Average crop output value per hectare for unconstrained businesses was 
approximately 25.82% higher than that of constrained businesses, with the former earning 
14.26% more than the average agricultural business and the latter earning 9.18% less. 
Borrowers in the sample reported average income that was 25.19% higher than that of non-
borrowers.  
Price rationed agricultural businesses are reported as earning a marginally higher average 
income than their unconstrained counterparts, providing evidence that price constraints are 
reflective of non-binding liquidity constraints. Agricultural businesses that experience 
transaction cost constraints report the largest deviation from the mean output value per 
hectare. Unconstrained producers generally earn more output value per hectare, except for 
those in the 3rd quintile, albeit reflecting a marginal difference between constrained and 
unconstrained agricultural businesses.  
For non-borrowing producers 68% of respondents can be found in quartiles one to three, 
whereas for borrowing businesses 67% of respondents were captured in quartiles four to six; 
which provides evidence as to why, on average, non-borrowing agricultural businesses earned 
less than those that borrowed money over the past 12 months for business purposes, despite 
the distribution of output value per hectare across quintiles suggesting otherwise. 
The largest reported variation from unconstrained producers was reported in the fifth quintile, 
across the various types of supply and demand-side constraints. Agricultural businesses that 
were price constrained recorded higher output values per hectare in the uppermost quintile 
than those that were unconstrained, reinforcing the absence of any binding constraints. On the 
contrary, businesses that were quantity and risk constrained reported lower average crop 
output values per hectare in the first and fifth quartiles; providing support for the binding 
constraints experienced by agricultural businesses and households.
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics 
Variables 
Full sample  
(N = 3316) 
  
Unconstrained  
(N = 1322) 
  
Constrained  
(N = 1994) 
  
t-stat 
(χ2) 
  Mean 
Standard  
error 
  Mean 
Standard  
error 
  Mean 
Standard  
error 
    
Outcome variables 
          
Output value per ha 735,472 (44,429)  
 
840,360 (59,267)  
 
667,930 (53,267)  
 
2.433 *** 
Log(output value per ha) 12.8047 (0.052)  
 
12.957 (0.054)  
 
12.707 (0.059)  
 
4.545*** 
           Selection variable 
          
Constrained 0.608 (0.014)  
        
           Farm characteristics 
          
Owned land (ha) 4.851 (0.179)  
 
5.181 (0.353)  
 
4.640 (0.167)  
 
1.436*** 
Owned storage or warehouse 0.638 (0.017)  
 
0.617 (0.022)  
 
0.653 (0.020)  
 
0.628*** 
Title 0.068 (0.007)  
 
0.086 (0.010)  
 
0.056 (0.007)  
 
6.949*** 
Irrigation system 0.211 (0.016)  
 
0.233 (0.017)  
 
0.196 (0.019)  
 
4.529*** 
Farmers association/cooperative 0.139 (0.014)  
 
0.188 (0.018)  
 
0.108 (0.014)  
 
32.289*** 
Full or part-time employees per ha 0.669 (0.044)  
 
0.712 (0.051)  
 
0.642 (0.047)  
 
1.515*** 
           Farmer and farm household 
characteristics           
Savings in financial institutions 0.232 (0.018)  
 
0.252 (0.019)  
 
0.219 (0.022)  
 
4.595** 
Number of dependents 7.339 (0.124)  
 
7.568 (0.185)  
 
7.192 (0.142)  
 
1.806*** 
Age of agribusiness head 44.523 (0.369)  
 
43.815 (0.484)  
 
44.978 (0.440)  
 
-2.101*** 
No education 0.088 (0.008)  
 
0.053 (0.008)  
 
0.110 (0.011)  
 
32.801*** 
Primary education incomplete 0.060 (0.006)  
 
0.064 (0.012)  
 
0.058 (0.008)  
 
0.361** 
Primary education completed 0.774 (0.011)  
 
0.777 (0.016)  
 
0.771 (0.013)  
 
0.428** 
Secondary education completed 0.079 (0.006)  
 
0.106 (0.010)  
 
0.061 (0.007)  
 
19.916*** 
Experience of agribusiness owner 0.863 (0.009)  
 
0.856 (0.014)  
 
0.867 (0.011)  
 
0.084** 
Gender of agribusiness head 0.886 (0.008)  
 
0.889 (0.011)  
 
0.884 (0.011)  
 
0.512** 
           Crop choice 
          
Agribusiness cultivates maize 0.188 (0.021)  
 
0.210 (0.025)  
 
0.173 (0.021)  
 
3.24* 
Agribusiness cultivates cassava 0.020 (0.004)  
 
0.018 (0.004)  
 
0.020 (0.005)  
 
1.351** 
Agribusiness cultivates cotton 0.088 (0.024)  
 
0.067 (0.015)  
 
0.101 (0.031)  
 
6.451** 
Agribusiness cultivates cashew nuts 0.083 (0.017)  
 
0.070 (0.015)  
 
0.091 (0.019)  
 
5.125** 
           Regional differences 
          
Northern region 0.144 (0.025)  
 
0.155 (0.024)  
 
0.137 (0.028)  
 
2.124** 
Western region 0.236 (0.039)  
 
0.195 (0.034)  
 
0.262 (0.044)  
 
10.827** 
Central region 0.054 (0.010)  
 
0.054 (0.011)  
 
0.053 (0.011)  
 
0.039** 
Southern highlands 0.212 (0.030)  
 
0.240 (0.034)  
 
0.194 (0.030)  
 
17.342*** 
Lake zone 0.108 (0.016)  
 
0.072 (0.012)  
 
0.131 (0.021)  
 
32.031*** 
Eastern Region 0.095 (0.016)  
 
0.107 (0.019)  
 
0.087 (0.016)  
 
2.337** 
Southern region 0.137 (0.025)  
 
0.153 (0.033)  
 
0.127 (0.024)  
 
0.642** 
Zanzibar region 0.015 (0.003)  
 
0.023 (0.006)  
 
0.010 (0.002)  
 
4.148** 
Urban EA 0.140 (0.017)  
 
0.163 (0.021)  
 
0.125 (0.017)  
 
15.724*** 
           Instrumental variables 
          
Government subsidy 0.303 (0.022)  
 
0.377 (0.027)  
 
0.256 (0.023)  
 
36.135*** 
Government extension services 0.232 (0.015)    0.288 (0.020)    0.197 (0.016)    30.381*** 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate that the mean values of subgroups are significantly different at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) 
significance levels 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics 
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Descriptive statistics that report the means and standard errors of the outcome, selection, and 
explanatory variables used in the study are presented in Table 10. We also present statistical 
significance tests that investigate the equality of means or proportions across credit constraint 
status for the continuous and binary variables, respectively. Around 60% of the full sample of 
agricultural businesses is constrained in the semi-formal sector. The differences in average 
crop output value per hectare, discussed earlier, are found to be statistically significant across 
unconstrained and unconstrained businesses; proving motivation for an investigation into the 
relaxation of credit constraints in Tanzania. 
The summary statistics report that the average agricultural businesses in the full sample owns 
4.85 hectares of land and approximately 63.8% of all crop producers in the sample own a 
storage or a warehouse facility. The results show that unconstrained agricultural businesses 
own more land, have marginally more employees per hectare, and a higher proportion owns 
storage space or an irrigation system than their constrained counterparts; however these 
findings are not statistically significant.  
It was reported that 6.8% of the agricultural businesses in the total sample of crop producers 
hold title over registered land; and we observed a marginally higher proportion that hold title 
deeds amongst the unconstrained businesses, relative to those that are credit constrained. 
Approximately 13.9% of producers are reported as being part of a cooperative or farmers 
association and a significantly larger proportion of unconstrained businesses were reported to 
be involved in associational activity relative to their constrained counterparts. 
The unconstrained agricultural businesses in the sample are significantly distinguishable from 
those that are constrained, with regards to characteristics of the farmer and farm household. It 
was reported that 23.2% of business owners across the full sample keep savings in formal 
financial institutions, while having an average of 7 dependents that are supported by the 
income of the business. The difference in the average number of dependents supported by 
constrained and unconstrained agricultural businesses is reported to be statistically significant 
at the 10% level. 
Agricultural business owners in the full sample are typically around 44 years old, with more 
than three quarters having completed secondary school. Owners of unconstrained businesses 
appear to be younger than their constrained counterparts; further, the former is represented by 
a significantly larger proportion of individuals that have completed their secondary education, 
while the latter reports a larger proportion of individuals with no education. 
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The results suggest that crop producers in the representative sample are predominately male 
and have more than five years experience in agricultural activity. Agricultural businesses that 
are unconstrained have a marginally higher proportion of female representation, while those 
that are constrained report a larger proportion of owners with experience; however, these 
differences are not statistically or economically significant. 
In the full sample of crop producers, approximately 18.8% are involved in maize production, 
while 2% are engaged in the production of cassava. Cotton and cashew nut producers account 
for 8.8% and 8.3% of the crop producers in the sample, respectively. For the aforementioned 
crops, the proportion of agricultural businesses that are unconstrained is larger than the 
proportion of those who are constrained, with the exception of the maize producers. These 
findings would suggest that producers of cash crops are less likely to be credit constrained, 
however the reported differences in relative proportions are not statistically significant. 
Approximately 14% of the crop producers were reported as being found in an urban 
enumeration area; hence, the majority of the agricultural businesses under study form part of 
the rural sector. A larger proportion of unconstrained agricultural businesses were observed in 
urban areas, when compared to the share of urban representatives amongst the constrained 
businesses. 
The findings reveal that 23.6% of the crop producers in the sample were observed in the 
Western region, followed by the Southern Highlands; together accounting for about 45% of 
the agricultural businesses’ locations. The unconstrained agricultural businesses in the sample 
are significantly distinguishable from constrained agricultural businesses across various 
regions. A significantly larger proportion of unconstrained businesses were reported as being 
in the Southern Highlands and the Zanzibar region when compared to the share of 
constrained businesses, and a smaller proportion is represented in the Western Region and 
Lake Zone. 
The receipt of a government subsidy to finance farm inputs was reported by 30.3% of the 
total sample, whereas 23.2% of all crop producers merely received extension services and 
advice from the government. Relative to constrained agricultural businesses, significantly 
larger proportions of unconstrained businesses are observed to have received an input subsidy 
or extension services from the government. This finding suggests that government support 
may aide in the relaxation of liquidity constraints. 
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In the section that follows, we estimate a rigorous econometric model to further investigate 
the differences in crop output value per hectare, after controlling for all extraneous variables. 
The impact of credit constraints on agricultural production in Tanzania can only be measured 
by taking into account any systemic differences between constrained and unconstrained 
agricultural businesses, while accounting for the possibility that individuals who are 
unconstrained might have earned a higher level of income even if their liquidity constraints 
were not relaxed. 
5.3 Econometric results 
Determinants of credit constraints 
The estimation results, reported in Table 11, show that an agricultural business owner who 
receives a government subsidy to finance agricultural inputs or who is in possession of a title 
deed is less likely to be quantity constrained in the formal or semi formal financial sector by 
16.5% and 18.7%, respectively. These findings are in line with our expectations and suggest 
that government support, in the form of net transfers, provides relief of the liquidity 
constraints experienced by agricultural businesses, while owned and registered land would 
enable crop producers to gain access to credit. 
Savings in formal financial institutions are reported to increase the likelihood of being 
quantity constrained by 20.5%. This finding is contrary to our expectations as access to 
alternative sources of liquidity is expected to reduce the external liquidity requirements of the 
business. However, the fungibility of savings and lack of mechanisms to monitor and control 
the use of funds may result in savings being channeled towards addressing the liquidity 
requirements of the farm household as opposed to farm production needs. Further, savings 
may be used as a mechanism to channel liquid resources away from productive activity. 
Ownership of fixed assets is expected to enhance the collateral position of an agricultural 
business, hence reducing the likelihood of being credit constrained. However, the results 
show that businesses owning a storage or warehouse facility are more likely to be quantity 
constrained by 14.1%; and by 13.5% when taking into account all constraints. This finding 
dismisses the argument positing the enhancement of collateral and suggests that fixed assets 
related to storage and warehouse facilities may not be as easily enforceable as pledges on 
owned and registered land.
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Table 11. Determinants of credit constraints and their impact on productivity 
Log-linear specification (Quantity constrained only) 
 Constraint status 
(0/1) 
Unconstrained  Constrained 
 
Log (output value per ha) 
Owned land (ha) -0.002*** (0.003)  -0.016*** (0.006)  -0.025*** (0.007)  
Employees per ha 0.003*** (0.025)  0.141*** (0.039)  0.189*** (0.034)  
Owned storage or warehouse 0.141*** (0.065)  -0.040*** (0.066)  -0.064*** (0.072)  
Title 
-
0.187*** 
(0.109)  -0.103*** (0.109)  0.067*** (0.186)  
Irrigation system 0.022*** (0.079)  0.515*** (0.076)  0.462*** (0.089)  
Farmers association/cooperative -0.025*** (0.095)  0.174*** (0.082)  0.224*** (0.105)  
Savings in financial institutions 0.205*** (0.078)  0.417*** (0.083)  0.686*** (0.094)  
Number of dependents -0.007*** (0.007)  -0.003*** (0.006)  -0.007*** (0.008)  
Age 0.000*** (0.003)  -0.011*** (0.002)  -0.002*** (0.003)  
Primary education completed -0.014*** (0.089)  0.180*** (0.081)  0.142*** (0.089)  
Secondary education completed -0.168*** (0.141)  0.329*** (0.154)  0.220*** (0.167)  
Experience 0.100*** (0.086)  0.000*** (0.092)  -0.283*** (0.112)  
Gender (male = 1) 0.125*** (0.092)  0.161*** (0.097)  -0.061*** (0.105)  
Maize == 1 0.055*** (0.082)  -0.079*** (0.081)  -0.057*** (0.105)  
Cassava ==1 0.193*** (0.178)  -0.379*** (0.186)  -0.348*** (0.242)  
Cotton == 1 0.054*** (0.130)  -0.311*** (0.103)  -0.185*** (0.117)  
Cashew nuts == 1 0.241*** (0.140)  -0.488*** (0.139)  -0.156*** (0.179)  
Western region 0.541*** (0.129)  0.089*** (0.151)  0.092*** (0.166)  
Central region 0.182*** (0.133)  -0.829*** (0.155)  -0.866*** (0.187)  
Southern highlands 0.174*** (0.116)  -0.121*** (0.116)  -0.181*** (0.139)  
Lake zone 0.278*** (0.117)  -0.375*** (0.137)  -0.265*** (0.160)  
Eastern Region 0.003*** (0.129)  0.060*** (0.127)  -0.156*** (0.182)  
Southern region 0.141*** (0.146)  0.029*** (0.137)  -0.321*** (0.186)  
Zanzibar region 0.089*** (0.179)  0.951*** (0.158)  0.775*** (0.233)  
Urban EA -0.058*** (0.087)  0.338*** (0.086)  -0.012*** (0.103)  
Government subsidy 
-
0.165*** 
(0.068)  
    
Government extension services -0.085*** (0.071)  
    
Constant 
-
0.758*** 
(0.212)  13.311*** (0.253)  12.742*** (0.405)  
       
σi   
1.082*** (0.095)  0.944*** (0.058)  
ρj   
0.588*** (0.243)  0.249 (0.291)  
Log-likelihood -1072975.8 
chi2 4.27*** 
n 3316 
Note: Estimation by Full Information Maximum Likelihood at the agricultural business level. Dependent variable 
of the outcome variable is the log of crop output value per hectare. The dependent variable of the selection 
equation is a binary variable indicating whether or not the household is quantity constrained. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. σi denotes the square-root of the variance of the error terms εji in the outcome equations 
captured by equation (7); ρj denotes the correlation coefficient between the error term ui of the selection equation 
(5) and the error term εji of the outcome equations (7). Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) 
significance levels. Dummy base variables omitted: No education or primary education incomplete; northern 
region. 
Table 11. Determinants of credit constraints and their impact on productivity (quantity constrained only) 
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Table 12. Determinants of credit constraints and their impact on productivity 
Log-linear specification (All constraints) 
 Constraint status 
(0/1) 
Unconstrained  Constrained 
 
Log (output value per ha) 
Owned land (ha) -0.002*** (0.003)  -0.011**** (0.005)  -0.033*** (0.006)  
Employees per ha -0.014*** (0.022)  0.149*** (0.033)  0.148*** (0.042)  
Owned storage or warehouse 0.135*** (0.065)  0.016*** (0.088)  -0.109*** (0.057)  
Title -0.100*** (0.106)  -0.141*** (0.127)  0.090** (0.127)  
Irrigation system -0.041*** (0.076)  0.342*** (0.085)  0.561*** (0.074)  
Farmers association/cooperative -0.275*** (0.090)  0.071*** (0.176)  0.173*** (0.096)  
Savings in financial institutions 0.075*** (0.079)  0.340*** (0.092)  0.589*** (0.069)  
Number of dependents 
-
0.015**** 
(0.006)  -0.006*** (0.011)  -0.002*** (0.006)  
Age 0.007*** (0.003)  -0.010**** (0.004)  -0.004*** (0.002)  
Primary education completed -0.078*** (0.092)  0.178*** (0.121)  0.143*** (0.067)  
Secondary education completed -0.377*** (0.146)  0.175*** (0.233)  0.310*** (0.136)  
Experience -0.101*** (0.083)  -0.214**** (0.103)  -0.106*** (0.095)  
Gender (male = 1) -0.025*** (0.088)  -0.057*** (0.110)  0.091** (0.087)  
Maize == 1 0.002*** (0.080)  -0.009*** (0.098)  -0.142*** (0.083)  
Cassava ==1 0.253*** (0.161)  -0.199*** (0.225)  -0.474*** (0.189)  
Cotton == 1 0.058*** (0.132)  -0.440*** (0.145)  -0.178*** (0.088)  
Cashew nuts == 1 0.425*** (0.146)  -0.191*** (0.255)  -0.413*** (0.152)  
Western region 0.208*** (0.126)  -0.202*** (0.180)  0.089*** (0.114)  
Central region 0.024*** (0.126)  -1.140*** (0.188)  -0.710*** (0.143)  
Southern highlands 0.058*** (0.105)  -0.358*** (0.137)  -0.049*** (0.111)  
Lake zone 0.320*** (0.115)  -0.308*** (0.244)  -0.319*** (0.116)  
Eastern Region -0.107*** (0.119)  -0.304*** (0.150)  0.187*** (0.137)  
Southern region -0.206*** (0.145)  -0.337*** (0.195)  -0.071*** (0.163)  
Zanzibar region -0.251*** (0.170)  0.756*** (0.212)  0.806*** (0.187)  
Urban EA -0.154*** (0.086)  0.261*** (0.111)  0.120*** (0.083)  
Government subsidy -0.232*** (0.076)  
    
Government extension services -0.181*** (0.069)  
    
Constant 0.306*** (0.203)  14.138*** (0.672)  12.720*** (0.214)  
       
σi   
1.067*** (0.237)  0.954*** (0.023)  
Rho 
  
0.558 (0.493)  0.078 (0.192)  
Log-likelihood -1071109.7 
chi2 1.03 
n 3316 
Note: Estimation by Full Information Maximum Likelihood at the agricultural business level. Dependent variable 
of the outcome variable is the log of crop output value per hectare. The dependent variable of the selection equation 
is a binary variable indicating whether or not the household is constrained (all constraints considered). Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. σi denotes the square-root of the variance of the error terms εji in the outcome 
equations captured by equation (7); ρj denotes the correlation coefficient between the error term ui of the selection 
equation (5) and the error term εji of the outcome equations (7). Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) 
significance levels. Dummy base variables omitted: No education or primary education incomplete; northern 
region. 
Table 12. Determinants of credit constraints and their impact on productivity (all constraints) 
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When taking into account all types of constraints, as reported in Table 12, access to 
information from government extension services and membership in a farmers’ association or 
cooperative are expected to reduce the likelihood of an agricultural business being 
constrained in the semi-formal sector by 18.1% and 27.5%, respectively; while businesses 
that receive a government subsidy are less likely to be constrained by 23.2%. These findings 
are consistent with our expectations that associational activity would enable a producer’s 
access to social networks and information, which would in turn enhance its reputation and 
profile in the community. Further, a government subsidy serves as supplementary liquidity 
for an agricultural business. 
We find that agricultural business owners that have completed secondary education are less 
likely to be credit constrained by 37.7%, considering all constraints; however, older business 
owners are more likely to experience credit constraints. Contrary to our expectations, the 
likelihood of being credit constrained is reduced by 1.5% for each additional dependent that 
relies on the income of the business. This finding may suggest that each additional dependent 
brings with them a contribution to the liquidity requirement of the household. 
Across all types of constraints, agricultural businesses that are found in urban areas are less 
likely to be constrained than those found in rural areas. Relative to the Northern region, 
liquidity constraints are more likely to be experienced by crop producers in the Western 
region or Lake Zone. Furthermore, cashew nut producers have an increased likelihood of 
being credit constrained. 
Impact of credit constraints 
When taking into account all constraints, both estimated parameters of the correlation 
coefficient  are not statistically different from zero, suggesting that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of no sample selectivity bias. However, the estimated covariances  and 
 provide evidence of endogenous switching and support the appropriateness of the 
estimation strategy. Moreover, the differences in the parameter estimates of the productivity 
model between agricultural businesses that are unconstrained and those that are credit 
constrained provide evidence of heterogeneity in the sample. 
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The estimates show that each additional hectare of land owned negatively impacts the crop 
output value per hectare of the constrained and unconstrained by 3.3% and 1.1% respectively, 
when taking into account all types of credit constraints; these findings are consistent with our 
expectations and are robust when only taking into account quantity constraints. 
The results show that savings in formal financial institutions, increases in family labour 
endowments, and ownership of an irrigation system significantly enhance the productivity of 
constrained and unconstrained crop producers in the sample, in the context of either quantity 
constraints only or all constraint types. The estimated coefficients would suggest that 
constrained agricultural businesses experience a larger positive impact from having access to 
savings than their unconstrained counterparts. When considering all types of credit 
constraints, savings enhance the productivity of constrained businesses by 58.9%, while 
unconstrained businesses’ productivity is increased by 34%. This finding suggests that there 
is a larger impact in relaxing liquidity constraints for those who are constrained than 
unconstrained businesses. 
In line with our expectations, an increase in the number of employees per hectare would 
increase the output value per hectare of quantity constrained agricultural businesses by 
18.9%, while businesses that do not experience quantity constraints would have relatively 
lower improvements in productivity by 14.1%. In consideration of all constraints, the relative 
enhancements from increased labour units are similar for constrained and unconstrained 
households at 14.8% and 14.9% respectively. 
When taking into account all constraints, constrained agricultural businesses that own 
irrigation systems are expected to increase their productivity by 56.1%, while the 
productivity of unconstrained businesses is improved by 34.2%. This finding provides 
evidence that improvements in the quality of fixed assets enhances the productivity of 
constrained agricultural businesses to a greater extent than the impact on unconstrained 
businesses; however, when taking into account quantity constraints only, the impact on the 
former is larger than the effects experienced by the latter. 
A male-headed agricultural business is expected to earn a higher output value per hectare 
than a female headed business; although this finding is significant at the 10%, it is subject to 
bias as a result of the underrepresentation of females in the sample of crop producers. When 
taking into account all types of credit constraints, the results suggest that the gender of the 
owner does not affect the economic output of the business. 
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In considering all types of constraints, ownership of a storage or warehouse facility 
diminishes the productivity of constrained agricultural businesses by approximately 10.9%, 
however there is no effect on productivity when considering quantity constraints only. This 
finding is contrary to our expectations, however it is consistent with the diminishing returns 
to scale expected from increases in the land endowment. Despite having the capability to 
acquire fixed capital, an agricultural business may have challenges in scaling up their variable 
inputs in order to capture any efficiency that may arise from the availability of increased 
capacity. 
As expected, constrained business owners across all types of constraints, are shown to 
enhance crop output value per hectare by an average of 17.3% when gaining membership of a 
farmers’ association or cooperative. Quantity constrained businesses experience a greater 
positive impact from associational activity than their unconstrained counterparts. 
For agricultural businesses that are constrained, in the context of all constraints, an owner 
who had completed primary school is expected to increase farm productivity by 14.3% and 
completion of secondary school is expected to enhance productivity by 31%, relative to an 
owner that had neither completed primary school nor attended school entirely. For quantity 
constrained agricultural businesses, there are no significant enhancements to production as a 
result of higher levels of education; however for those businesses that are unconstrained, the 
completion of primary and secondary school increases crop output value per hectare by 18% 
and 32.9% respectively. 
The age of the owner is expected to diminish the productivity of unconstrained agricultural 
businesses, with each additional year reducing the output value per hectare by around 1%. 
Constrained businesses are not significantly affected by the age of the owner, however the 
results show that the experience of an owner in farming-related activities adversely impacts 
productivity when considering all types of constraints and quantity constraints respectively. 
While experience is expected to enhance the labour capacity available to the business owner, 
the results may suggest that involvement of a producer in farming-related activities for five 
years or more does not necessarily address considerations of the quality of labour or 
experience. 
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Consistently across regions and credit constraint definitions it appears that unconstrained 
agricultural businesses found in urban areas have a higher productivity. Relative to the 
Northern region, businesses in the Central region have lower output  value per hectare, 
however those in the Zanzibar region have a higher productivity. Taking into account all 
types of constraints, constrained agricultural businesses in the Lake Zone and unconstrained 
businesses in the Southern Highlands, Eastern Region, and Southern Region have a lower 
expected crop output value per hectare. 
In consideration of all types of credit constraints, selection of crop type does not have a 
significant effect on crop output value per hectare except for a negative impact on cotton 
producers. For constrained agricultural businesses, the choice to produce cassava, cashew 
nuts, cotton, or maize would adversely impact productivity relative to alternative crop 
choices; with cassava and cashew nuts having the largest impact, reducing output value per 
hectare by 47.4% and 41.3%. Quantity constrained producers are not significantly affected by 
crop choice, however their unconstrained counterparts are adversely affected by the choice of 
all stipulated crops except maize. These findings would suggest that transaction cost and risk 
constraints play a more critical role when it comes to crop choice and its impact on 
productivity than quantity constraints. 
In order to examine the reliability and robustness of the results we estimate an alternative 
model, which redefines the labour and land endowments as their natural logarithm 
equivalents. The alternative specification will be estimated using the alternative definitions of 
credit constraints, taking into account quantity constraints only and all credit constraints, 
respectively. 
The results of the robustness tests presented in Appendix Table 13 and 14 are mostly 
consistent with the findings presented earlier in terms of estimation strategy. There is 
consistency across most of the avenues through which crop output value per hectare is 
impacted by credit constraint status, however some differences are observed in the results. In 
particular, the farmer and farm household characteristics such as education and experience no 
longer have an impact on the productivity of constrained agricultural businesses, when taking 
into account all constraints; further, ownership of a storage or warehouse facility is no longer 
significant as a measure of fixed capital and membership in a farmers association or 
cooperative ceases to be significant across all definitions of credit constraints. 
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Table 13 presents the average expected crop output value per hectare24 under actual and 
counterfactual credit constraint status conditions for agricultural businesses in Tanzania. The 
predicted outcomes of crop output value per hectare are obtained from the endogenous 
switching regression model and used to examine differences between those who were 
observed to be unconstrained and constrained by semi-formal financial institutions, 
respectively. The evaluation of treatment effects is done using the broader operationalization 
of credit constraint status that takes into account quantity, transaction costs, and risk 
constraints. 
Table 13. Average expected output value per hectare; treatment and heterogeneity effects 
Sub-samples  
(constraint status) 
Observed outcome 
Treatment effects 
 
Unconstrained ( y0i) Constrained ( y1i) 
Unconstrained (ki=0) (a) 567,422 (c) 462,226 TT =  105,196 *** 
 
(17,250)  (19,973)  (26,391)  
Constrained (ki=1) (d) 1,206,117 (b) 412,750 TU =  793,367 *** 
 
(26,224)  (9,148)  (27,774)  
Heterogeneity effects BH₁  =  –638,695 *** BH₂  =  49,475 ** TH =  –688,171 *** 
 
(31,389)  (21,968)  (19,550)  
Note: All constraint types (i.e. quantity, transaction costs, and risk constraints). See note of table 7.  
Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) significance levels. 
Table 13. Average expected output value per hectare; treatment and heterogeneity effects 
Cells (a) and (b) of Table 13 represent the expected crop output value per hectare observed in 
the sample, while cells (c) and (d) represent the counterfactual cases. The expected crop 
output value per hectare earned by agricultural businesses that were unconstrained was 
approximately TZS 567,422 per hectare, while agricultural businesses that were constrained 
in the semi-formal sector were expected to earn TZS 412,750. Although the expected crop 
output value of agricultural businesses that were observed to be unconstrained was 37.47% 
more than credit constrained agricultural businesses, it should be noted that this simple 
comparison may be misleading, and is insufficient to infer a causal relationship between 
credit constraint status and economic outcome. 
The last column Table 13 presents the treatment effects of credit constraint status on crop 
productivity. In the counterfactual case (c), agricultural businesses that were actually 
unconstrained would have earned approximately TZS 105,196 per hectare or 18.45% less if 
they became credit constrained. 
                                                          
24 The average expected crop output value per hectare is calculated by taking the exponential transformation of 
the estimated natural logarithm form. 
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In the counterfactual case (d), agricultural businesses that were actually constrained would 
have earned approximately TZS 793,367 per hectare or 192.21% more if their credit 
constraints were relaxed. These results suggest that the relaxation of credit constraints 
significantly increases agricultural productivity. The negative and significant transitional 
heterogeneity of TZS 688,171 suggests that the impact of credit constraint relaxation is larger 
for agricultural businesses that are constrained relative to the impact on those that were 
unconstrained. 
The last row of Table 13 adjusts for any base heterogeneity in the sample. Agricultural 
businesses that were actually unconstrained would have earned TZS 49,475 per hectare or 
12% more than the agricultural businesses that were constrained in the counterfactual case 
(c). This finding suggests that unconstrained agricultural businesses are marginally better 
crop producers than constrained businesses regardless of credit constraint status. In the 
counterfactual case (d), constrained agricultural businesses whose credit constraints had been 
relaxed would have earned TZS 639,695 or 112.56% more than agricultural businesses that 
were actually unconstrained. These results further reinforce that the relaxation of credit 
constraints increases agricultural productivity as measured by crop output value per hectare; 
and that the impact is more significant for those agricultural businesses that are observed to 
be constrained. 
In order to test the consistency of our impact evaluation results we further estimate treatment 
effects using the narrower definition of credit constraint status that only takes into account 
quantity constraints; presented in Appendix Table 15.  In addition to testing the robustness of 
our results, the comparison is expected to provide insights into the different impacts of the 
relaxation of credit constraints when supply-side and demand-side constraints are addressed. 
When only considering quantity constraints, the expected crop output value of unconstrained 
agricultural businesses is reported to decline by 14.74% or TZS 72,888 per hectare relative to 
the expected value under all types of considerations, while the expected productivity value of 
constrained businesses is reported to increase by 6.19% or TZS 27,217 per hectare. The 
counterfactual case where an unconstrained agricultural business becomes constrained 
reported a 36.20% decrease to TZS 339,361 per hectare, whereas the case where the quantity 
constraints of a constrained business are relaxed results in a 5.01% increase in crop output 
value per hectare relative to the broader definition of credit constraints. 
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In considering all types of constraints, the treatment on the treated is approximately TZS 
49,977 per hectare or 32.21% less when considering quantity constraints only; the treatment 
on the untreated is marginally less by TZS 36,451 per hectare or 4.39%. The marginal decline 
in the transitional heterogeneity by TZS 13,525 per hectare of 2% suggests that the relative 
impact of relaxing credit constraints is consistent between constrained and unconstrained 
agricultural businesses regardless of the definition of credit constraint status. 
Despite the consideration of all types of constraints presenting a result suggesting that 
unconstrained agricultural businesses may be better crop producers than their constrained 
counterparts, it is notable to highlight that this result is reversed when only taking into 
account quantity constraints. The base heterogeneity of quantity constrained agricultural 
businesses reflects a higher crop output value per hectare for those businesses that are 
actually constrained relative to the counterfactual case experienced by unconstrained 
agricultural businesses; while the base heterogeneity of unconstrained businesses provides 
further evidence for the disproportionate impact experienced by constrained businesses upon 
the relaxation of credit constraints. 
5.4 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter described characteristics of the key variables used in this study and presented the 
significant empirical findings. An investigation into the sources and uses of funds was 
presented, in addition to highlights of the income distribution of crop producers by credit 
constraint status. The determinants of credit constraint status were explored and the impacts 
of constraints evaluated. The impact evaluation was further enhanced by the estimation of 
treatment effects experienced by constrained and unconstrained agricultural businesses. 
It was found that unconstrained agricultural businesses earn more than constrained 
businesses, with the former experiencing a disproportionately larger deviation from the mean 
crop output value per hectare. Borrowing businesses faired better than non-borrowers as 
funds primarily sourced from friends and family, savings and credit groups, and microfinance 
institutions were channeled into business activities. 
Larger proportions of unconstrained agricultural businesses held a registered title and savings 
in formal financial institutions, and were involved in associational activity; further, they 
tended to be found in rural areas, produced cash crops, and received government support. A 
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large proportion of owners in unconstrained businesses were found to have completed 
secondary education, and have more dependents. 
The likelihood of being credit constrained was reduced for agricultural businesses that were 
found in urban areas, received a government subsidy to finance inputs, or were in possession 
of a title deed. Furthermore, owners that completed secondary education and had more 
dependents were less likely to be constrained. Agricultural businesses run by relatively older 
owners that held savings, owned storage facilities, participated in associational activity or 
obtained information from government extension services had an increased likelihood of 
being credit constrained. 
The treatment of credit constraint relaxation is disproportionately larger for constrained 
agricultural businesses than for the treated businesses observed as unconstrained. As 
evidenced by a marginal difference in transitional heterogeneity, the relative impact of 
relaxing credit constraints is consistent irrespective of definition of constraint status. 
Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to irrefutably suggest that unconstrained 
agricultural businesses are better producers than their constrained counterparts. Adopting the 
narrower definition of constraint status, that only takes quantity constraints into account, 
narrows the expected earnings range between unconstrained and constrained agricultural 
businesses. Hence, the full impact of credit constraints on agricultural productivity may be 
underestimated when transaction cost and risk constraints are overlooked. 
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Chapter 6. Discussion of results 
6.1 Overview of the key findings of the study 
The agricultural sector contributes substantially to the economic output and labour force of 
Tanzania, however the former has been steadily declining. The sector accounts for around 
three quarters of the total labour force and despite the aggregate economy having grown at an 
average real growth rate of 6.3% between 2007 and 2013, the agricultural sector lags behind 
at 3.9%. The crop sub-sector accounts for the largest contribution to agricultural GDP, which 
has grown more rapidly than the economically active population in agriculture. In 2013, 
agricultural exports accounted for 25.1% of total exports, however fuel products, machinery, 
and transport equipment are driving growth in exports. 
The largest food crops produced in Tanzania are maize and cassava, while the largest cash 
crops are cotton, cashew nuts and tobacco. Food crops account for the largest contribution to 
production output and areas harvested, and generally recorded higher yields over the period 
under study than cash crops; however we observe more substantial growth in the cash crop 
area under harvest. Further, gross food crop production has grown at a more accelerated 
annual average rate relative to the growth of the population. 
The research approach undertaken by this study covered two steps, namely: 1) the direct 
elicitation of the credit constraint status of agricultural businesses, and 2) an investigation 
into its impact on crop output value per hectare. The former was captured in a selection 
equation and the latter in an outcome equation; and an endogenous switching regression 
model captured the simultaneous estimation of these equations. The characteristics of the 
agricultural business, the owner, and the farm household were explored in order to explain 
the avenues by which agricultural businesses may have been credit constrained and how this 
would impact their performance. Subsequently, treatment effects were estimated to analyze 
the relationship between credit constraint status and agricultural productivity. 
An evaluation of the robustness of the results was undertaken by estimating a log-log 
specification of the econometric model, in addition to the initial log-linear model; and the 
validity of the study was tested by comparing the estimation results when defining credit 
constraint status using quantity constraints only and all constraints, respectively. 
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Agricultural businesses earned an average crop output value of TZS 735,472 per hectare, 
with unconstrained businesses earning 14.26% more and constrained businesses earning 
9.18% less. Approximately 60.28% of the full sample of agricultural producers was 
constrained in the semi-formal sector, with quantity constraints accounting for 36.34%. 
The primary sources of credit to the agricultural sector were family and friends, savings and 
credit groups and microfinance institutions, and the primary motivations for borrowing were 
business expansion and the settlement of operational expenses. Agricultural businesses that 
borrowed earned more than non-borrowing businesses, while quantity, risk, and transaction 
costs constraints adversely impacted the earnings potential of agricultural producers. On the 
contrary, price constrained agricultural businesses earned marginally more than their 
unconstrained counterparts. 
We observed statistically larger proportions of agricultural businesses with a registered title 
deed or membership to a cooperative or farmers’ association when comparing unconstrained 
agricultural businesses to constrained businesses. There were no significant differences found 
across credit constraint status with regards to land ownership size, storage or warehouse 
ownership, adoption of irrigation technology, or number of employees per hectare. 
Unconstrained agricultural businesses exhibited significantly different farmer and farm 
household characteristics relative to those who were constrained, with the former having a 
larger proportion that holds savings in formal financial institutions and more dependents than 
the latter. 
A substantial proportion of agricultural business owners had completed primary education 
and a statistically significant proportion of unconstrained business owners had completed 
secondary school. However, a significant proportion of constrained agricultural business 
owners had not completed any schooling. Producers in the sample tended to be male, with a 
large proportion having more than five years of experience in agricultural activity. 
A higher proportion of unconstrained agricultural businesses received government support, in 
the form of net transfers and advice, relative to their constrained counterparts. Further, the 
results report that producers of cash crops were less likely to be credit constrained. A large 
proportion of agricultural businesses were found in rural areas, with the Western and 
Southern regions accounting for the largest proportions of businesses in the sample. 
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Agricultural businesses were less likely to be credit constrained if they were found in urban 
areas, and in particular crop producers in the Zanzibar region were expected to be less 
constrained than those in the Northern region. Crop producers were less likely to be 
constrained if they had completed secondary school, and for each additional dependent on the 
income of the business; and were less likely to be quantity constrained if they were in 
possession of a title deed. The receipt of a government subsidy to finance agricultural inputs 
further reduced the likelihood of being credit constrained. 
Producers of cashew nuts and those found in the Western region or Lake zone were more 
likely to be credit constrained. Savings in formal financial institutions increased the 
likelihood of being quantity constrained, while storage or warehouse facility ownership, 
participation in associational activity, and information from government extension services 
increased the likelihood of an agricultural businesses being credit constrained when taking 
into account all constraints. Further, older businesses were more likely to be constrained. 
Agricultural productivity was enhanced by savings in formal financial institution, increases in 
the available labour endowment and the adoption of irrigation technology; however it was 
diminished by increases in the land endowment available to an agricultural business. 
Although male-headed agricultural businesses that are not quantity constrained were found to 
positively and significantly impact agricultural productivity, female-headed agricultural 
businesses were grossly underrepresented in the sample. Further, the stance that the impact of 
the business owner’s gender was not significant was reinforced in the context of all 
constraints. 
Storage or warehouse facility ownership was shown to reduce farm productivity when all 
constraints were taken into account, however regardless of the constraint definition, farmers’ 
association or cooperative membership resulted in enhanced crop productivity. 
A significant positive relationship was reported between the level of education and farm 
productivity, for constrained agricultural businesses in the context of all constraints and 
unconstrained businesses with regards to quantity constraints. However, there is a significant 
negative relationship between an agricultural business owner’s age and their productivity; 
further, experience of five years or more is expected to adversely affect crop output value per 
hectare. 
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Agricultural businesses in urban areas exhibited higher productivity than those in rural areas. 
The results reveal significant heterogeneity based on geographic location of crop producers, 
with businesses in the Central region commanding lower earnings and those in Zanzibar 
earning higher income relative to the Northern region. 
Selection of crop type did not appear to have a significant impact on the earnings outcome of 
agricultural businesses, with the exception of the negative impact experienced by cotton 
producers. Constrained businesses were consistently and adversely affected across the 
selections of crop type. The results provide evidence of transaction cost and risk constraints 
being the channel by which crop choice impacts agricultural productivity. 
When taking into account all types of constraints, the results of the treatment effects reveal 
that constrained businesses were expected to increase their earnings by 192.2% if their credit 
constraints were relaxed, whereas unconstrained agricultural businesses would have earned 
18.5% less if they became constrained. When relaxing constraints on the agricultural 
businesses observed as constrained, our findings suggest that their earnings would have been 
enhanced beyond that of their observed unconstrained counterparts by 112.7%. However, 
when imposing constraints on unconstrained agricultural businesses they still faired better 
than their counterparts actually observed as being constrained, possibly due to innate 
unobservable characteristics that make them better producers. 
An examination of the expected observations, under a narrower definition of credit constraint 
status, finds crop output values per hectare that are 14.7% lower for unconstrained 
agricultural businesses and 6.2% higher for constrained businesses, relative to the broader 
definition of credit constraints. These deviations capture the effect of transaction cost and risk 
constraints on expected earnings. 
The treatment on the treated is 32.2% larger under the broader definition, whereas the 
treatment on the untreated is 4.4% larger. The marginal increase in transitional heterogeneity 
of 2% provides evidence to suggest that the relative impact of relaxing credit constraints for 
the treated and untreated is consistent irrespective of the definition of credit constraint status. 
Further, the result under consideration of all constraints that suggests unconstrained 
agricultural businesses may be better producers is refuted under the narrow definition, which 
finds that businesses observed to be constrained fair better relative to unconstrained 
businesses under counterfactual considerations of quantity constraints. 
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6.2 Synthesis of findings with empirical literature and theory 
Credit rationing describes an excess demand for credit, while credit constraints represent the 
ensuing experiences of unsatisfied borrowers and non-borrowers who lack access. A 
substantial proportion of agricultural businesses in this study participated in credit, however a 
significant share of the respondents was classified as credit constrained. Broadly speaking, 
access to credit addresses the ability and extent of a loan applicant to borrow, whereas 
participation in credit is marked by a borrowing event. 
The credit market in Tanzania has expanded significantly since the reformation of the 
financial sector, and is characterized by formal, semi-formal, and informal financial 
institutions. Formal financial institutions are the primary suppliers of finance and financial 
intermediation services in Tanzania, with commercial banks accounting for the majority of 
loans disbursed to the economy. However, the allocation and growth of commercial credit to 
agriculture has been relatively low when compared to other sectors. Despite the proliferation 
of suppliers of credit, agricultural businesses are persistently subject to credit rationing. 
The standard argument of classical economic analysis suggests that the equilibrium price of 
credit should clear the market and ensure an efficient allocation of resources; however in the 
presence of information asymmetries, the standard argument is undermined. Information in 
credit markets is imperfect and costly, and the resultant problems of adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and enforcement difficulties provide a theoretical basis for credit rationing. 
Direct mechanisms to overcome asymmetric information rely on lenders’ resources and 
capabilities in screening applicants, monitoring their behavior, and enforcing loan 
agreements, while the design of contracts is an inextricable aspect of indirect mechanisms. 
Indirect mechanisms may be undermined by the nature of the activities being funded and/or 
the endowments available to borrowers. Due to the costly nature of direct mechanisms, 
lenders may be more inclined to avoid violations of stipulated loan contract terms by 
withdrawing credit. The proximity of the stakeholders in semi-formal and informal 
arrangements bridges the information gap in a cost effective manner and enables 
enforceability through more effective monitoring and control of borrower operating and 
financial behaviour. In the sample, family and friends are the primary suppliers of credit, in 
terms of the number of loans distributed; followed by savings and credit groups and 
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microfinance institutions. As such, the primary motivation of borrowing to address business 
related activities was upheld. 
Semi-formal member-based organisations are the most dominant and arguably the most 
important financial institutions in Tanzania; and they are typically characterized by non-
governmental organisations that promote rural development and cooperatives linking loan 
applicants’ access to credit to their savings behaviour. Savings and credit groups that operate 
at the village or community level characterize informal financial institutions. Semi-formal 
institutions oftentimes serve as a liaison between formal institutions looking to expand their 
market reach in the informal sector and communities with demand for financial resources. 
In addition to its function as the price of credit, the interest rate may play a role in 
determining the risk composition of a lender’s loan portfolio while inducing certain 
behaviours in loan applicants. Under ideal conditions, an increase in interest rates would 
enable a lender to accommodate excess demand in credit markets, however this may be 
undermined by an increase in the probability of default associated with the loan portfolio. 
Hence, credit rationing would ensue, as a lender’s expected return is not necessarily 
commensurate with any increases in the interest rate. 
The simultaneity of decision-making for a credit constrained agricultural household may lead 
to a misallocation of resources as the consumption and production sides of the household 
compete for liquidity. In the context of a static agricultural household model we focus on the 
production side of the household to explore the determinants of credit constraints and its 
impact on productivity. Significant determinants influencing the likelihood of being credit 
constrained and differences in the parameter estimates of the output model provide evidence 
of heterogeneity between unconstrained and constrained agricultural businesses. 
In the current study, the possession of a title deed and the receipt of a government subsidy to 
finance inputs reduce the likelihood of being constrained. In particular, holding title for 
registered land enhances the quality and enforceability of a loan contract; hence, providing an 
alternative mechanism to quantity rationing. In Polish rural credit markets, interest rate 
subsidies did not enhance the allocation of credit, suggesting that policy interventions 
targeting agricultural development may be more effective by addressing the pervasive 
information asymmetries in agricultural finance. Irrespective of the type of constraint 
experienced by crop producers in our study, a government subsidy is expected to contribute 
to the initial liquid endowment of an agricultural business and provide relief for credit 
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constraints. The input subsidy directly addresses an agricultural business’s need for enhanced 
farm inputs. 
As production decisions are typically dependent on the level of credit available, a constrained 
choice set of farm inputs is expected to arise from constrained access to credit. Consequently, 
the presence of a binding credit constraint can lead to underinvestment in agricultural 
production, with resultant adverse impacts on gross agricultural output and income. 
Access to information and social networks may provide opportunities for agricultural 
businesses to improve their access to credit, in addition to taking advantage of other financial 
intermediation and advisory services. Participation in associational activity and information 
received from government extension services are expected to address information 
asymmetries, however it was found that they increased the likelihood of being credit 
constrained. These findings suggest that having access to information and networks is 
necessary, but not sufficient, to relieve credit constraints; the quality of information is of 
paramount importance. Further, the sources and relevance of information need to be further 
evaluated. 
In Tunisia, the short-term operational needs of farmers were undermined by credit 
constraints, whereas their long-term investment needs were not; addressing the constraints on 
production could have enhanced the livelihoods of these farmers. However, improvements in 
participation in microcredit were shown to be insignificant or detrimental to welfare in 
Malawi, particularly in the absence of institutions that seek to enhance human capital and 
create a conducive environment for seamless, uninterrupted, agricultural operations. 
Access to liquidity positively impacted the productivity of coffee producers in Tanzania and 
contributed favourably to addressing poverty and inequality in the highland areas of the 
Northern region. A significant conclusion drawn from the study was that the intentions 
underlying the provision of credit may be misguided if intervention strategies do not take into 
consideration differences between a household’s access to credit and the experience of 
liquidity constraints, particularly in a context where constraint status is self-reported. 
We find that constrained crop producers in our sample of Tanzanian agricultural businesses 
earn substantially less than unconstrained businesses. Further, we observe that the relaxation 
of credit constraints disproportionately enhances the productivity of businesses observed as 
constrained, relative to the treatment effects experienced by businesses observed as 
unconstrained. 
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As expected, crop output value per hectare is enhanced through increases in the labour 
endowment and ownership of irrigation technology. The improved quality and availability of 
inputs contributes directly to agricultural productivity, while indirectly improving the welfare 
of the agricultural household. However, the negative relationship between land endowment 
and productivity suggests that the average agricultural business in the sample is subject to 
diminishing returns to scale. 
In this study, a positive significant relationship was observed between savings in formal 
financial institutions and productivity; however agricultural businesses with savings are more 
likely to be credit constrained. By making use of their own available initial liquidity 
endowments, businesses are able to support production and consumption activity. 
In China, the fungibility of formal credit resulted in the allocation of credit away from 
agricultural production and towards consumption and investment activities; suggesting that 
increased access to credit would only marginally improve productivity. The positive 
relationship between holding savings and being credit constrained provides evidence in 
support of the fungibility argument and presents a possible explanation for credit rationing in 
Tanzania. However, in contrast to the Chinese case that reports the allocation of fungible 
funds away from productive activity, the Tanzanian case suggests that fungible funds may be 
allocated toward business activities. 
In Peru, it was found that the elimination of credit constraints would be expected to enhance 
agricultural productivity, particularly when taking into account all constraints, namely, 
quantity, transaction cost, and risk constraints. In Rwanda, findings suggested that transaction 
costs and small loan amounts were responsible for the persistent credit rationing in credit 
markets. 
Despite making use of random samples, the representativeness of the results documented by 
previous empirical studies is constrained to the areas under study. While the impact of credit 
constraints may have been reliably estimated, the results presented may not be readily 
generalizable beyond the samples being investigated. Furthermore, the credit rationing 
literature reviewed is dominated by an emphasis on supply-side constraints. 
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The impact of credit constraints in our study is more pronounced for agricultural businesses 
that are observed as credit constrained than unconstrained businesses under counterfactual 
considerations, when considering either quantity constraints only or all types of constraints. A 
further examination of the expected observations, under a narrower definition of credit 
constraint status that only takes into account quantity constraints, reports a narrower crop 
output value per hectare range between unconstrained and constrained agricultural 
businesses, relative to the broader definition of credit constraints. Empirically and practically, 
a broader definition of credit constraint status and an acknowledgement of its impacts would 
lend a hand to broader policy considerations in addressing credit rationing in developing 
markets. 
6.3 Policy recommendations 
The agricultural sector has undergone vast changes since the dawn of Tanzania’s 
independence. The intention of the liberation movement was to uphold the principles of self-
reliance and equality through the enhancement of agricultural production and social service 
provision at the village level; however, misaligned incentives, misallocated resources, and a 
macroeconomic environment that was not conducive to the expansion of the public sector 
continually hampered expected economic outcomes. 
The economy has transgressed its socialistic foundations wherein the public sector was the 
main driver of economic activity. Reform programmes, driven by the global development 
community, served as a catalyst for the transformation of the economy towards a more 
liberalized and market oriented paradigm. Nevertheless, agricultural development continues 
to be a mainstay of economic development in Tanzania. The National Strategy for Growth 
and Reduction of Poverty and the National Agricultural Policy aim to drive the modernization 
of the sector into a commercial vehicle with the potential to boost productivity and 
competitiveness. 
The agricultural policy framework should be designed to create a conducive, enabling, and 
stable environment for the realization of the development goals of Tanzania, while attracting 
investment from the private sector based. In spite of a clear framework for financial 
institutions there are various challenges related to the allocation of financial resources to the 
agricultural sector. The transformation of the sector is required in order to provide 
opportunities for agricultural development beyond the current characterization of smallholder 
farmers that operate on a semi-subsistence level. 
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Imperfect and costly information and control mechanisms may induce lenders to ration credit 
to the agricultural sector. This in turn would lead to underinvestment in the economy, which 
would undermine the welfare goals of society. We propose various direct and indirect 
interventions to tackle the market failures highlighted by this study. While the former 
describes the government’s actual participation in the economy, the latter relates to their 
influence on the economic environment as a means to induce behaviour that addresses the 
market failures identified. We acknowledge that the roles and responsibilities undertaken by 
government need to be moderated to guard against a culture of dependency, while ensuring 
that the private sector is not crowded out of economic activity. 
Improved access to credit and information may be instrumental in enabling desirable levels of 
investment for the realization of increased income, poverty alleviation and improvements in 
living standards. An input subsidy serves to mitigate the quantity constraints of an 
agricultural business by directly addressing its liquidity needs. The provision of subsidies to 
finance agricultural inputs has been shown to be effective in reducing the likelihood of an 
agricultural business being credit constrained, however the sustainability of this mechanism 
needs to be evaluated. Additionally, the government should be more proactive in enhancing 
the savings capacities of agricultural business owners in rural areas. 
The government may consider providing subsidies to address the high transaction costs 
experienced in the provision of formal financing solutions to the rural sector. In particular, the 
subsidy will address agricultural businesses lack of preparation to get a loan by providing an 
opportunity to get technical assistance on where to obtain credit and how to go about it. The 
quality of information is of paramount importance to ensure that, in addition to its role in 
supporting the production outcome of agricultural businesses, the likelihood of being credit 
constrained is reduced. 
Due to uncertainty in the broader economy and the perceived risks of rural sector activity, 
credit suppliers do not readily support medium to long-term agricultural projects. While the 
short-term operational needs of agricultural businesses are important, the modernization and 
commercialization of the sector is reliant on the commitment of patient capital. In order to 
assuage the fears of potential investors, the government may directly promote information 
related to rural activity and corresponding investment opportunities. 
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The limited reach of the current financial market infrastructure and the allocation of 
commercial credit to agriculture may be strengthened by coordinating the efforts of various 
financial institutions. The government should support semi-formal financial institutions in 
their efforts to serve as channels by which formal institutions enter and expand their reach in 
informal markets. Moreover, informal institutions may benefit from best practice and 
technical assistance obtained from formal or semi-formal institutions. 
The legal and regulatory framework underlying financial intermediation and the allocation of 
capital should serve as a mechanism to enhance access to credit by providing for the seamless 
enforcement of contractual obligations. Additionally, consumer protection policy should 
emphasize the rights and recourse available to borrowers or potential borrowers in order to 
guard against their exploitation. 
It is important that regulation addresses the asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers; hence, providing a mechanism to mitigate against potential risks of default. 
However, the complexity of regulation pertaining to the provision of financial services, 
particularly when it comes to client on-boarding requirements, contributes to the high 
transaction costs prevalent in the provision of credit and may have the unintended 
consequences of inhibiting borrowing activity. Information related to relevant regulations 
should be simply and regularly communicated and the regulatory authorities may consider 
training the main stakeholders that are primarily impacted. While regulatory requirements 
should not place unnecessary information and cost burdens on stakeholders, it is critical that 
the regulatory environment is appropriately sophisticated to curb malpractice and 
mismanagement in financial institutions. 
The complexity, inadequacy and inappropriateness of financing products and services 
available to rural agricultural businesses tend to protract the semi-subsistence nature of the 
agricultural sector and inhibit its development. Agricultural policy should support the 
educational development of agricultural business owners in order to enhance their financial 
decision making capabilities, while enabling them to cultivate sustainable borrowing 
behaviour. Further, policy should aid in supporting agricultural businesses to improve their 
quality of labour and managerial capabilities in order to optimize the use of their initial 
liquidity endowment, fixed factors of production, and farm inputs. 
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The goals highlighted by the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 have been core to the 
developmental agenda of Tanzania since the dawn of independence and are expected to 
continue to shape her policy landscape into the foreseeable future, with support from the 
Agricultural Sector Development Strategy and its operationalization in the form of the 
Agricultural Sector Development Programme. 
6.4 Recommendations for future research 
The research approach, findings, and recommendations presented by this study raise a need 
for further research, to better understand the relationship between an agricultural business’s 
credit constraint status and its agricultural productivity. Further, there is scope for the 
research limitations identified by this study to be addressed by research efforts going forward. 
Agricultural businesses that are credit constrained may have systematically different 
characteristics to businesses that are unconstrained; hence, unobservable characteristics may 
affect both a business’s constraint status and their productivity. The non-random sampling 
approach taken by this study may result in inconsistent estimates, which are not 
representative or generalizable to the Tanzanian agricultural sector. Furthermore, sampling 
error may arise due to the selection of the crop producer subsample from the entire sample of 
agricultural businesses. Hence, selection bias may result from unobservable factors that are 
not adequately captured by the econometric model. A sampling design that deliberately 
captures agricultural producers may provide an opportunity to improve on the 
representativeness of the sample.  
The endogeneity problem may be addressed by simultaneously estimating the selection and 
outcome equations, as undertaken by this study; however, a more robust strategy would be to 
take an experimental approach and randomly assign access to credit to treatment and control 
agricultural businesses, respectively. Further research may incorporate experimental designs 
in order to control for any confounding factors that could influence the economic outcomes of 
agricultural businesses, while enhancing the validity of the control group as a counterfactual 
in assessing the implications of credit constraint relaxation. 
Measurement and identification issues may arise due to the use of secondary data. The 
operationalization of the credit constraint status of an agricultural business is limited by the 
reliability of the qualitative information used for direct elicitation, while the gross income 
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measure captured in the survey may overestimate the crop output value earned by the average 
agricultural business. 
Future research is encouraged to obtain primary responses to tailor-made survey instruments 
that are purposefully designed to directly elicit the credit constraint status of each respondent. 
Additionally, more detailed information related to access to and participation in credit should 
be recorded. In particular, information related to the credit limit available to agricultural 
businesses and their loans outstanding would provide quantitative measures from which 
excess demand for credit may be elicited. 
The economic outcome of an agricultural business may be better evaluated by ensuring that 
the performance indicator of interest is appropriately measured. Challenges with the gross 
income variable used in this study provide scope for more detailed information to be obtained 
about businesses’ sources of income. Moreover, input and output prices may be captured 
exogenously by future research. Additionally, the survey randomly selects a single 
agribusiness from the eligible household members available. Hence, there is room for further 
research to be conducted at the household level, which may provide more insights into the 
aggregate earnings and welfare of the agricultural household. 
The cross-sectional nature of the survey precludes an evaluation of the reliability and 
generalizability of the results over time. Hence, as an extension to the static framework 
adopted by this study, future research may explore the dynamic implications of credit 
constraints on agricultural production. The current study explicitly focuses on the production 
side of agricultural household decision-making within a static framework. However, a more 
robust theoretical model may be developed in order to investigate the idiosyncrasies of the 
consumption side of the agricultural household. 
An evaluation of the cost implications of addressing the identified market failures is beyond 
the scope of this study. It is critical that the feasibility and sustainability of any policy 
recommendations are evaluated in the context of a cost-benefit analysis, which clearly 
provides evidence that the benefits of the public sector’s interventions will outweigh the 
costs. 
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Chapter 7. Concluding remarks 
Using a nationally representative sample of agricultural businesses in Tanzania, this paper 
investigates the determinants of credit constraints and their impact on crop output value per 
hectare. There is significant evidence to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship 
between credit constraint status and agricultural productivity of Tanzanian crop producers. 
Credit constraints are found to significantly negatively impact agricultural productivity; 
hence, unconstrained agricultural businesses earn more than their constrained counterparts. 
We directly elicit constraint status and find that a large portion of crop producers was 
constrained in the formal and semi-formal credit market. Subsequently, we simultaneously 
estimate the selection and outcome equation using an endogenous switching regression 
model, and finally evaluate the treatment effects and analyze the significance of the impact 
that credit constraint status has on agricultural productivity. 
The likelihood of being credit constrained is found to be reduced if an agricultural business 
was located in an urban area, held a title for owned and registered land or received an input 
subsidy from the government; with more education or dependents improving constraint status 
even further. Savings in formal institutions, warehouse or storage ownership, or advice from 
the government or farmers’ associations increased the likelihood of constraints. 
We found that the treatment effect of the relaxation of credit constraints was significantly 
positive and larger for agricultural businesses observed as unconstrained, when compared to 
the unconstrained counterfactual. Further, this paper provides evidence in support of a 
broader definition of credit constraints in policy discourse, which includes transaction costs 
and risk constraints, in addition to quantity constraints. 
Agricultural policy should aim to tackle credit rationing, by addressing the imperfect and 
costly information and control mechanisms that perpetuate frictions in credit and agricultural 
markets. The government should spearhead the coordinated efforts of various financial 
institutions, public and private stakeholders, and most importantly, the farmer. Further, it is 
important that a conducive environment is established to enhance confidence in the stability 
of the economy, while balancing the complexity and comprehensiveness of regulation. 
Addressing the credit constraints experienced by agricultural businesses is a critical step in 
achieving the eradication of poverty and the improvement of living standard. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Preliminary diagnostics: linear specification 
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Appendix 2. Preliminary diagnostics: non-linear specification 
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Appendix Table 1. Selected Population and Labour Statistics 
Appendix Table 2. GDP at 2007 Prices by Economic Activity 
Appendix Table 3. Annual GDP growth at 2007 Prices 
 
Appendix Table 1. Selected population and labour statistics ('000) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total Population - Both sexes 41,120 42,354 43,640 44,973 46,355 47,783 49,253 50,757 
Total economically active population 20,286 20,921 21,595 22,306 23,055 23,843 24,675 25,555 
Total economically active population in Agriculture 15,693 16,084 16,496 16,928 17,379 17,851 18,346 18,865 
Source: FAOSTAT (2015c; 2015d; 2015e) 
        
         
         Appendix Table 2. GDP at 2007 prices by economic activity (TZSbn) 
Economic Activity 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing 7,182 7,721 8,115 8,333 8,622 8,903 9,186 
 Industry and construction 5,406 5,759 5,950 6,489 7,271 7,566 8,426 
 Mining and quarrying 935 844 1,002 1,074 1,142 1,218 1,265 
 Manufacturing 1,880 2,094 2,192 2,388 2,554 2,659 2,834 
 Electricity, gas and water supply 474 498 520 560 544 561 607 
 Construction 2,117 2,323 2,236 2,467 3,031 3,128 3,720 
 Services 12,691 13,228 13,994 15,081 16,347 17,530 18,627 
 Commerce 3,127 3,323 3,407 3,715 4,099 4,273 4,488 
 Transport and communications 2,188 2,289 2,583 2,980 3,157 3,502 3,810 
 Financial intermediation, real estate and business services 3,469 3,716 3,978 4,352 4,634 4,913 5,158 
 Goverments, community, social and personal services 3,907 3,900 4,026 4,034 4,457 4,842 5,171 
 Net taxes and FISM 1,491 1,559 1,734 1,781 1,951 1,954 2,332 
 GDP at 2007 prices 26,770 28,267 29,793 31,684 34,191 35,953 38,571 
 Source: NBS and MOF (2015)        
 
         
         Appendix Table 3. Annual GDP growth at 2007 Prices (%) 
Economic Activity 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing  7.50 5.10 2.70 3.50 3.30 3.20 
 Industry and construction  6.50 3.30 9.10 12.10 4.10 11.40 
 Mining and quarrying  -9.70 18.70 7.20 6.30 6.70 3.90 
 Manufacturing  11.40 4.70 8.90 7.00 4.10 6.60 
 Electricity, gas and water supply  5.10 4.40 7.70 -2.90 3.10 8.20 
 Construction  9.70 -3.70 10.30 22.90 3.20 18.90 
 Services  4.20 5.80 7.80 8.40 7.20 6.30 
 Commerce  6.30 2.50 9.00 10.30 4.20 5.00 
 Transport and communications  4.60 12.80 15.40 5.90 10.90 8.80 
 Financial intermediation, real estate and business services  7.10 7.10 9.40 6.50 6.00 5.00 
 Goverments, community, social and personal services  -0.20 3.20 0.20 10.50 8.60 6.80 
 Net taxes and FISM  4.60 11.20 2.70 9.50 0.20 19.30 
 GDP at 2007 prices   5.60 5.40 6.30 7.90 5.20 7.30 
 Source: NBS and MOF (2015)        
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Appendix Table 4. Shares of agricultural GDP 
Appendix Table 5. Annual GDP growth by agricultural sub-sector 
Appendix Table 6. Production Indices 
 
Appendix Table 4. Shares of agricultural GDP at 2001 Prices (%) 
Economic activity 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Crops 50.2 50.3 50.5 51.0 51.7 52.1 52.3 
Livestock 35.0 35.2 35.2 34.8 34.2 33.7 33.3 
Forestry and hunting 8.9 8.6 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.8 
Fishing 5.9 5.9 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: NBS and MOF        
        
        Appendix Table 5. Annual GDP growth by agricultural sub-sector at 2001 Prices (%) 
Economic activity 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Crops  7.8 5.5 3.6 4.8 4.2 3.5 
Livestock  8.1 5.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 
Forestry and hunting  3.8 5.1 3.4 3.3 3.5 4.7 
Fishing  7.3 0.4 0.9 2.6 3.0 5.3 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing   7.5 5.1 2.7 3.5 3.3 3.2 
Source: NBS and MOF        
        Appendix Table 6. Production indices (2007 = 100) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Food crops 
       
Maize 100 149 91 129 119 139 146 
Rice, paddy 100 106 99 197 168 134 164 
Sorghum 100 57 73 82 83 86 86 
Millet 100 49 101 114 101 69 105 
Cassava 100 104 114 87 89 105 104 
Beans, dry 100 64 87 98 76 135 129 
Potatoes 100 104 132 227 239 190 272 
Sweet potatoes 100 104 107 183 270 228 234 
Total Food crop production 100 109 102 124 127 132 140 
        
Cash crops        
Seed cotton 100 184 133 133 82 176  
Coffee, green 100 88 128 82 124 135  
Tea 100 111 109 106 102 105  
Sisal 100 108 77 85 80 83  
Tobacco, unmanufactured 100 100 116 120 257 237  
Cashew nuts 100 107 85 80 132 132  
Total cash crop production 100 138 115 110 117 158   
Source: FAOSTAT (2015b) 
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Appendix Table 7. Area harvested (Ha) 
Appendix Table 8. Yield (Kg/Ha) 
 
Appendix Table 7. Area harvested (Ha) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Food crops        
Maize 2,600,340 3,980,970 2,961,330 3,050,710 3,287,850 4,118,120 4,120,270 
Rice, paddy 557,981 887,660 805,630 1,136,290 1119,320 799,361 928,273 
Sorghum 817,946 566,760 874,219 618,370 811,164 839,423 711,388 
Millet 400,000 213,972 398,506 345,855 328,112 260,417 334,575 
Cassava 779,067 837,744 1081,380 873,000 739,794 954,509 950,000 
Beans, dry 918,742 749,540 868,310 1,208,690 737,661 1,330,000 1,300,000 
Potatoes 125,000 134,415 195,690 172,970 203,089 170,000 203,165 
Sweet potatoes 396,134 204,500 651,940 576,220 699,073 670,000 675,000 
        
Cash crops        
Cotton 450,000 574,840 519,350 421,200 226,506 487,440 490,000 
Coffee, green 212,105 210,000 245,890 223,510 116,508 127,335  
Tea 22,382 23,590 23,758 11,410 8,551 3,750  
Sisal 41,882 44,199 53,774 59,915 56,097 58,051  
Tobacco, unmanufactured 44,000 47,000 55,210 78,930 168,488 155,527  
Cashew nuts 93,000 94,000 80,000 249,090 406,597 410,641   
Source: FAOSTAT (2015a) 
        
        Appendix Table 8. Yield (Kg/Ha) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Food crops 
       Maize 1,407 1,367 1,123 1,551 1,320 1,239 1,300 
Rice, paddy 2,405 1,600 1,657 2,332 2,009 2,252 2,364 
Sorghum 1,187 973 811 1,291 994 999 1,170 
Millet 770 699 784 1,015 951 821 965 
Cassava 6,673 6,437 5,471 5,210 6,281 5,723 5,684 
Beans, dry 968 761 891 718 916 902 885 
Potatoes 5,200 5,021 4,400 8,513 7,659 7,265 8,700 
Sweet potatoes 3,337 6,743 2,174 4,207 5,111 4,505 4,593 
 
       Cash crops 
       Cotton 446 641 514 634 722 722 724 
Coffee, green 230 205 254 179 520 520 
 Tea 1,398 1,475 1,438 2,906 3,742 8,750 
 Sisal 738 753 443 440 443 443 
 Tobacco, unmanufactured 1,150 1,081 1,063 772 772 772 
 Cashew nuts 996 1,054 989 298 301 298 
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Appendix Table 9. Commercial banks domestic lending by economic activity 
Appendix Table 10. Growth of commercial banks domestic lending by economic activity 
 
Appendix Table 9. Commercial Banks domestic lending by economic activity (TZSbn) 
Economic Activity 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing 547.9 854.5 938.8 1 061.90 1 147.50 
Agriculture, Hunting, and Forestry 498 773.3 895.9 1 027.20 1 110.60 
Fishing 49.9 81.2 42.9 34.7 36.9 
Industry and construction 1 285.60 1 629.20 1 929.80 2 388.20 2 887.00 
Mining and Quarrying 33.9 42.3 55.2 96.7 185.8 
Manufacturing 786.5 928.2 991.8 1 160.60 1 423.80 
Electricity, gas and water 283.1 338.5 472.1 616.4 623.6 
Building and Construction 182.1 320.1 410.7 514.4 653.7 
Services 3 820.50 4 740.60 5 602.20 6 447.00 8 193.80 
Commerce 1 314.90 1 933.60 2 266.40 2 646.60 3 219.20 
Transport, storage and communications 534.1 560.3 633.4 745.5 980.5 
Financial intermediation, real estate and business 
services 
256.1 452.1 577.3 661.8 921.8 
Goverments, community, social and personal services 1 715.40 1 794.60 2 125.10 2 393.10 3 072.20 
Total 5 654.00 7 224.20 8 470.80 9 897.00 12 228.30 
Source: BoT (2015) 
      
      Appendix Table 10. Growth of commercial banks domestic lending by economic activity (%) 
Economic Activity 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing  56.00 9.90 13.10 8.10 
Agriculture, Hunting, and Forestry  55.30 15.90 14.70 8.10 
Fishing  62.60 -47.10 -19.20 6.30 
Industry and construction  26.70 18.50 23.80 20.90 
Mining and Quarrying  24.70 30.30 75.40 92.10 
Manufacturing  18.00 6.80 17.00 22.70 
Electricity, gas and water  19.60 39.50 30.60 1.20 
Building and Construction  75.80 28.30 25.20 27.10 
Services  24.10 18.20 15.10 27.10 
Commerce  47.10 17.20 16.80 21.60 
Transport, storage and communications  4.90 13.00 17.70 31.50 
Financial intermediation, real estate and business services 76.50 27.70 14.60 39.30 
Goverments, community, social and personal services 4.60 18.40 12.60 28.40 
Total   28 17 17 24 
Source: BoT (2015) 
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Appendix Table 11. Variables definitions 
 
Appendix Table 11. Variables definitions 
Variable name Definition 
Outcome variables 
Output value per ha Output value/ha 
Log(output value per ha) Log(output value/ha) 
  
Selection variable 
Constrained dummy = 1 if business is quantity constrained by semiformal or formal institution 
Price constrained dummy = 1 if business is price constrained 
Transaction cost constrained dummy = 1 if business is transaction-cost constrained 
Risk constrained dummy = 1 if business is risk constrained 
 
 Farm characteristics 
Owned land (ha) Farm size (hectares owned) 
Owned storage or warehouse dummy = 1 if the business owns a warehouse/storage 
Title dummy = 1 if business owner has title deed for owned land 
Irrigation system dummy = 1 if business owns an irrigation system, 0 otherwise 
Farmers association/cooperative dummy = 1 if business got advice from cooperative/farmer's association 
Full or part-time employees per 
hectare Total labour/hectare 
  
Farmer and farm household characteristics 
Savings in financial institutions dummy = 1 if business has savings in a formal institution, 0 otherwise 
Number of dependents Number of people dependent on the business income 
Age of business head Age of business owner 
No education dummy = 1 if business owner has completed no education, 0 otherwise 
Primary education incomplete dummy = 1 if business owner has completed some primary school, 0 otherwise 
Primary education completed dummy = 1 if business owner has completed primary school, 0 otherwise 
Secondary education completed dummy = 1 if business owner has completed secondary school, 0 otherwise 
Experience of business owner dummy = 1 if business owner has 5 or more years experience, 0 otherwise 
Gender of business head dummy = 1 if business owner is male, 0 oitherwise 
  
Crop choice 
Maize dummy = 1 if primarily involved in maize production 
Cassava dummy = 1 if primarily involved in cassava production 
Cotton dummy = 1 if primarily involved in cotton production 
Cashew nuts dummy = 1 if primarily involved in cashew production 
  
Regional differences 
Northern region dummy = 1 if business is in the northern region, 0 otherwise 
Western region dummy = 1 if business is in the western region, 0 otherwise 
Central region dummy = 1 if business is in the central region, 0 otherwise 
Southern highlands dummy = 1 if business is in the southern highlands region, 0 otherwise 
Lake zone dummy = 1 if business is in the lake region, 0 otherwise 
Eastern Region  dummy = 1 if business is in the eastern region, 0 otherwise 
Southern region dummy = 1 if business is in the southern region, 0 otherwise 
Zanzibar region dummy = 1 if business is in zanzibar, 0 otherwise 
Urban EA dummy = 1 if business is in an urban stratum, 0 otherwise 
  
Instrumental variables 
Government subsidy dummy = 1 if agricultural business received an input subsidy from the government 
Government extension services dummy = 1 if agricultural business received advice from the government 
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Appendix Table 12. Test on the validity of the selection instruments 
 
Appendix Table 12. Test on the validity of the selection instruments 
 
Log-linear specification 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
All constraints 
 Constrained 
(0/1) 
Constrained = 1 
 
Log (output value per 
ha) 
Owned land (ha) -0.001*** (0.003)  -0.033*** (0.006)  
Employees per ha -0.012*** (0.019)  0.149*** (0.042)  
Owned storage or warehouse 0.120*** (0.064)  -0.114*** (0.058)  
Title -0.100*** (0.104)  0.094*** (0.137)  
Irrigation system -0.032*** (0.077)  0.560*** (0.092)  
Farmers association/cooperative -0.279*** (0.086)  0.176**** (0.086)  
Savings in financial institutions 0.070*** (0.086)  0.579*** (0.079)  
Number of dependents -0.017*** (0.007)  -0.001*** (0.006)  
Age 0.007*** (0.003)  -0.004*** (0.002)  
Primary education completed -0.083*** (0.097)  0.139*** (0.063)  
Secondary education completed -0.349*** (0.146)  0.316*** (0.130)  
Experience -0.097*** (0.084)  -0.105*** (0.086)  
Gender (male = 1) -0.038*** (0.086)  0.091** (0.078)  
Maize == 1 0.008*** (0.076)  -0.144*** (0.083)  
Cassava ==1 0.267*** (0.172)  -0.477*** (0.186)  
Cotton == 1 0.058*** (0.136)  -0.182*** (0.092)  
Cashew nuts == 1 0.440*** (0.133)  -0.436*** (0.190)  
Western region 0.203*** (0.119)  0.090*** (0.214)  
Central region 0.032*** (0.118)  -0.701*** (0.257)  
Southern highlands 0.049*** (0.112)  -0.059*** (0.220)  
Lake zone 0.316*** (0.117)  -0.318*** (0.219)  
Eastern Region -0.104*** (0.111)  0.197*** (0.224)  
Southern region -0.223*** (0.146)  -0.057*** (0.262)  
Zanzibar region -0.280*** (0.195)  0.814*** (0.254)  
Urban EA -0.166*** (0.090)  0.131*** (0.104)  
Government subsidy -0.239*** (0.079)  0.043*** (0.067)  
Government extension services -0.174*** (0.074)  0.042*** (0.102)  
Constant 0.333*** (0.206)  12.767*** (0.345)  
     
Wald test on instruments χ² = 19.859 *** F-Stat. =  0.330  
n 3330 1994 
Note: Model 1: Probit model; Model 2: ordinary least squares (R2 = 0.2802).  
Estimation at the agricultural business level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) significance level. Dummy base variables 
omitted: No education or primary education incomplete; northern region. 
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Appendix Table 13. Determinants of credit constraints and their impact on productivity: robustness tests 
Log-linear specification (Quantity constrained only) 
 Constraint status 
(0/1) 
Unconstrained  Constrained 
 
Log (output value per ha) 
Log (owned land) 0.030*** (0.054)  -0.320*** (0.047)  -0.173*** (0.081)  
Log (employees per ha) -0.038*** (0.044)  0.252*** (0.042)  0.363*** (0.069)  
Owned storage or warehouse 0.013*** (0.077)  -0.048*** (0.072)  -0.128*** (0.102)  
Title 
-
0.339**** 
(0.149)  -0.071*** (0.108)  -0.199*** (0.384)  
Irrigation system 0.198**** (0.097)  0.434*** (0.079)  0.706*** (0.137)  
Farmers association/cooperative 0.062*** (0.113)  0.139*** (0.085)  0.098*** (0.162)  
Savings in financial institutions 0.123*** (0.101)  0.419*** (0.084)  0.620*** (0.134)  
Number of dependents -0.009*** (0.008)  0.007*** (0.006)  -0.010*** (0.015)  
Age -0.001*** (0.003)  -0.010*** (0.003)  -0.010*** (0.004)  
Primary education completed 0.006*** (0.101)  0.231*** (0.088)  0.082*** (0.130)  
Secondary education completed -0.174*** (0.166)  0.424*** (0.158)  -0.325*** (0.276)  
Experience 0.204*** (0.111)  -0.007*** (0.088)  -0.008*** (0.167)  
Gender (male = 1) -0.014*** (0.113)  0.101*** (0.093)  -0.146*** (0.162)  
Maize == 1 0.110*** (0.098)  -0.007*** (0.079)  0.103*** (0.137)  
Cassava ==1 0.478*** (0.213)  -0.217*** (0.199)  -0.033*** (0.415)  
Cotton == 1 0.071*** (0.150)  -0.213*** (0.132)  -0.077*** (0.188)  
Cashew nuts == 1 0.300*** (0.156)  -0.706*** (0.147)  -0.103*** (0.238)  
Western region 0.415*** (0.175)  -0.070*** (0.159)  0.024*** (0.339)  
Central region 0.066*** (0.166)  -0.828*** (0.154)  -0.785*** (0.221)  
Southern highlands 0.103*** (0.142)  -0.020*** (0.113)  -0.333*** (0.188)  
Lake zone 0.303*** (0.151)  -0.482*** (0.142)  -0.287*** (0.295)  
Eastern Region -0.076*** (0.161)  0.061*** (0.132)  -0.238*** (0.219)  
Southern region 0.040*** (0.168)  0.105*** (0.147)  -0.391*** (0.232)  
Zanzibar region -0.040*** (0.217)  0.651*** (0.171)  0.401*** (0.318)  
Urban EA -0.053*** (0.117)  0.271*** (0.093)  0.005*** (0.149)  
Government subsidy -0.115*** (0.070)  
    
Government extension services 
-
0.188**** 
(0.081)  
    
Constant 
-
0.594**** 
(0.253)  13.526*** (0.231)  12.831*** (0.956)  
       
σi   
0.914*** (0.039)  1.185*** (0.434)  
Rho 
  
0.341*** (0.176)  0.746*** (0.435)  
Log-likelihood -601931.73 
chi2 4.93 *** 
n 2116 
Note: Estimation by Full Information Maximum Likelihood at the agricultural business level. Dependent variable of the 
outcome variable is the log of crop output value per hectare. The dependent variable of the selection equation is a binary 
variable indicating whether or not the household is quantity constrained. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. σ i denotes 
the square-root of the variance of the error terms εji in the outcome equations captured by equation (7); ρj denotes the 
correlation coefficient between the error term ui of the selection equation (5) and the error term εji of the outcome equations 
(7). Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) significance levels. Dummy base variables omitted: No education or 
primary education incomplete; northern region. 
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Appendix Table 14. Determinants of credit constraints and their impact on productivity: robustness tests 
Log-linear specification (All constraints) 
 Constraint status 
(0/1) 
Unconstrained  Constrained 
 
Log (output value per ha) 
Log (owned land) 0.033*** (0.052)  -0.280*** (0.057)  -0.248*** (0.059)  
Log (employees per ha) -0.034*** (0.043)  0.235*** (0.053)  0.331*** (0.048)  
Owned storage or warehouse 0.098*** (0.080)  -0.005*** (0.091)  -0.076*** (0.088)  
Title -0.200*** (0.141)  -0.073*** (0.138)  -0.057*** (0.180)  
Irrigation system 0.118*** (0.093)  0.348*** (0.098)  0.626*** (0.104)  
Farmers association/cooperative -0.208* (0.107)  0.095*** (0.113)  -0.101*** (0.124)  
Savings in financial institutions 0.091*** (0.097)  0.400*** (0.101)  0.524*** (0.103)  
Number of dependents -0.015** (0.007)  0.004*** (0.007)  -0.008*** (0.010)  
Age 0.006*** (0.003)  -0.009** (0.004)  -0.006*** (0.003)  
Primary education completed -0.082*** (0.112)  0.212*** (0.132)  0.103*** (0.097)  
Secondary education completed -0.426*** (0.172)  0.292*** (0.218)  -0.150*** (0.207)  
Experience 0.025*** (0.107)  -0.083*** (0.102)  -0.047*** (0.119)  
Gender (male = 1) -0.010*** (0.113)  -0.031*** (0.119)  0.028*** (0.119)  
Maize == 1 0.087*** (0.095)  0.131*** (0.103)  -0.070*** (0.099)  
Cassava ==1 0.530*** (0.203)  0.074*** (0.237)  -0.264*** (0.237)  
Cotton == 1 -0.015*** (0.156)  -0.361*** (0.178)  -0.113*** (0.141)  
Cashew nuts == 1 0.470*** (0.165)  -0.471*** (0.219)  -0.338*** (0.188)  
Western region 0.033*** (0.175)  -0.119*** (0.218)  -0.192*** (0.173)  
Central region 0.107*** (0.165)  -0.863*** (0.222)  -0.808*** (0.158)  
Southern highlands 0.116*** (0.140)  -0.058*** (0.158)  -0.197*** (0.126)  
Lake zone 0.474*** (0.152)  -0.235*** (0.247)  -0.374*** (0.175)  
Eastern Region 0.022*** (0.153)  -0.012*** (0.186)  -0.047*** (0.155)  
Southern region -0.177*** (0.171)  -0.042*** (0.191)  -0.291*** (0.177)  
Zanzibar region -0.139*** (0.216)  0.640*** (0.217)  0.299*** (0.231)  
Urban EA -0.168*** (0.115)  0.178*** (0.124)  0.064*** (0.114)  
Government subsidy -0.163*** (0.071)  
    
Government extension services -0.266*** (0.080)  
    
Constant 0.050*** (0.261)  13.908*** (0.399)  13.028*** (0.377)  
       
σi   
0.922*** (0.104)  1.087*** (0.149)  
Rho 
  
0.448*** (0.340)  0.689*** (0.269)  
Log-likelihood -604624.9 
chi2 4.22**** 
n 2116 
Note: Estimation by Full Information Maximum Likelihood at the agricultural business level. Dependent variable of the 
outcome variable is the log of crop output value per hectare. The dependent variable of the selection equation is a binary 
variable indicating whether or not the household is constrained (all constraints considered). Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. σi denotes the square-root of the variance of the error terms εji in the outcome equations captured by equation (7); 
ρj denotes the correlation coefficient between the error term ui of the selection equation (5) and the error term εji of the 
outcome equations (7). Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) significance levels. Dummy base variables omitted: 
No education or primary education incomplete; northern region. 
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Appendix Table 15. Average expected output value/hectare, treatment and heterogeneity 
effects 
 
Appendix table 15. Average expected output value/hectare; treatment and heterogeneity effects 
Sub-samples  
(constraint status) 
Observed outcome Treatment effects 
Unconstrained ( y0i) Constrained ( y1i)  
Unconstrained (ki=0) (a) 494,534 (c) 339,361 TT =  155,173 *** 
 
(12,035)  (19,679)  (23,068)  
Constrained (ki=1) (d) 1,269,785 (b) 439,967 TU =  829,818 *** 
 
(35,906)  (16,444)  (39,493)  
Heterogeneity effects BH₁  =  –775,251 *** BH₂  =  –100,606 *** TH =  –674,645 *** 
 
(37,870)  (25,645)  (27,709)  
Source: Adapted from Di Falco et al (2011, p.837); Asfaw et al (2012, p.287) 
Note: Quantity constraints only.  See note of table 7. Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 
10% (*) significance levels. 
 
 
